Why the Prague summit may come too late to save NATO

Date: 14/11/02

Can the Alliance be mended or is it beyond repair? Dick Leonard looks at NATO's chances of survival

A SPECTRE is haunting Lord Robertson, the secretary-general of NATO. It is called the Western European Union (WEU). Founded in 1948, it still has a residual existence, with headquarters in Brussels, but it has long since ceased to have any significance.Robertson repeatedly referred to the WEU in a speech which he made to the European Policy Centre in the Belgian capital on 8 November. On paper it was perfect, he said, 'but you can't send a piece of paper to solve a crisis'. What was lacking, he asserted, was the political will to make this theoretically perfect organisation work.

He is clearly concerned lest NATO should suffer the same fate, after being sidelined by the United States over Afghanistan and with little prospect of being called upon to play a central role in any action over Iraq. It risks being squeezed out between American unilateralism and European moves to build up the military capacity of the EU.

Robertson puts his faith in the upcoming Prague NATO summit, on 21-22 November, to take a range of fundamental decisions to ensure the continued relevance of his organisation.

It is far from certain whether, even if these decisions are taken, they will be sufficient to ensure its survival.

One certain outcome of Prague is a substantial increase in NATO membership. Robertson spoke cautiously of invitations being extended to 'between one and nine candidate countries', but the general expectation is that seven will be favoured.

These are the three Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - together with Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.

The first five will almost certainly be admitted into the European Union at around the same time. For Bulgaria and Romania, their invitations will be a 'consolation prize' for the delay in their own EU membership until 2007, or even later. Macedonia and Albania, the other NATO hopefuls, will almost certainly miss out at Prague.

For the seven set to join, the Alliance will be a further major step in their consolidation into the liberal-democratic culture of Western Europe.

Yet it is doubtful if they will bring much in the way of 'added value' to NATO's military capacity.

The new members will, however, be asked to make 'niche' contributions best suited to their own experience and resources.

Romania, for example, could provide troops trained in mountain warfare, while the Czech Republic, which joined NATO three years ago, has special expertise in tracing and combating biological and chemical weapons.

Beefing up the overall military strength of NATO will be the major agenda item at Prague, where President George W. Bush is certain to draw attention to the growing disparity between the American and European contributions.

After the recent massive increase of 46 billion (45.5 billion euro) in the US defence budget, total annual expenditure will rise to 355 billion (350 billion euro) - more than twice that of the 17 European NATO members, which totals around 160 billion (158 billion euro).

Although both the British and the French are now spending more on defence, there is no realistic chance that there will be a general increase this side of the Atlantic. Robertson, who has a shrewd political sense, is well aware of this, and places his hopes squarely on persuading the European nations to spend their money more effectively. 'More bang for your euro' is his line of thinking.

This would involve cutting out wasteful competition in defence procurement, cooperating more closely in R & D and investing more in air-lift capacity, control systems and precision weapons - three of the areas in which European nations were shown to be most deficient during the Bosnian and Kosovo wars.

Though Robertson is too tactful to say so in public, this would also call into question the maintenance of large conscript forces by Germany and some other European nations, and - in the case of Britain and France - the retention of 'independent' nuclear forces, which may add to national prestige, but make nil contribution to overall security.

Robertson will also throw his weight behind US Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's proposal for a Rapid Response Force which would be able to be deployed at short notice far away from NATO's normal theatres of operations.

The objective would be to put a force of 21,000 men into the field within seven days. Many of the troops earmarked for this force would also be on standby for the European Union's own Rapid Reaction Force, but this is not thought to raise insuperable difficulties.

Even if the short-term requirements for strengthening NATO, to allow it to play a significant role in the war on terrorism, are met at Prague, its long-term survival remains in doubt.

This subject is addressed by a thought-provoking paper, What Future for NATO?, just published by the London-based think-tank, the Centre for European Reform.

Its two authors effectively pose the question: can NATO be mended or is it beyond repair?

Former US top policy advisor Stanley Sloan takes the first position. The second is argued, with some reluctance, by Peter Van Ham, of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Sloan argues that, in order to survive, NATO must go 'global', and be in a position to meet security threats wherever they arise. This would require the US to curb its unilateral instincts and Europe to increase its 'hard power' capabilities, while NATO's command structure would have to be reconstructed on a functional rather than geographical basis.

Van Ham's view is that the divergence between the US and European strategic perspectives is now too wide for NATO to play a meaningful role.

Europe must learn to stand on its own feet, and take over responsibility for its own security - in effect leaving the US to police the rest of the world, while the European Union would contribute 'soft power' in the form of low level peace-keeping activities and economic aid.

This reflects the view argued by the eminent US scholar, and Brussels resident, Robert Kagan, in an influential article in the journal Policy Review last summer. It is not an outcome which would be welcome to many Europeans, but it is perhaps inevitable if they are not prepared to make greater sacrifices than now seems probable.

Can the Alliance be mended or is it beyond repair? Author looks at NATO's chances of survival.