When the great Russian bear is awakened

The resurgence of Russia has become a major Western preoccupation - not least because the great bear seems to be rattling bars quite strongly lately: from disputes over missile defence, Polish beef and Lithuanian energy to stand-offs over Transdniestria, Georgia and Kosovo - and there is now also a demand from Russia for an emergency conference on arms control in Europe, which has not stopped it from testing a ballistic missile. Then there is the specific EU-Russia relationship which has been allowing many a pundit and ‘senior official’, in the Union and member states, to reflect on its apparent awfulness.

Wading through the piles of words, it seems the vast majority of opinion can be summarised thus: Russia has somehow become strong, stronger than realised and the bear is breaking out of the cage. Worse still, while it is not threatening us militarily, it holds vast energy reserves that it wishes to manipulate us poor Europeans with. Since we wish to fuel our economy and maintain our standard of living, we have no choice but to give in to this manipulation - though we know Russia is actually an undemocratic state with a dire human rights record.

There is much wrong with this narrative - not because Russia is actually a Western-style democracy or a champion of human rights, but because of its utter passivity. The entire perception of Russia and the EU-Russia relationship seems to rest on the assumption that ultimately there is nothing to be done but accept its energy supremacy and give in to it at every stage - but at the same time thoroughly dislike it for being powerful.

It is a narrative of the weak, which exposes the EU in all its foreign policy inadequacy: a group of states and institutions incapable of creating a coherent strategy - or even tactic - in the face of a common external interest. The 2004 enlargement states, most especially those bordering on Russia, despise this narrative and have therefore begun to use their own abilities to change it through their veto power. Yet, ultimately, they offer no coherent alternative other than asserting themselves within the Union and demanding the EU assert itself in the face of Russia: to be Russian to Russia, so it will back down.

There is no chance of Russia currently backing down, for a number of reasons. It does have a lot of money and feels very prosperous due to its energy reserves. Its Cold War arch enemy - the US - is vastly unpopular around the world, which allows it plenty of easy wins on the international stage. Finally, and possibly most significantly, Russia has entered an election year and loud nationalist propaganda based on cheap diplomatic victories plays incredibly well.

All of this may suggest there is little room for a more moderate relationship between Russia and the EU. But that would be wrong, since behind the caustic words other things are happening too: last week (26 May) the Russian upper house, the Duma, ratified the partnership for peace, status of forces agreement with NATO, which allows for Russian forces both to exercise and deploy together with NATO and the previous week the Russian chief of defence also met his NATO counterparts for the day, with mutual issues aired. Both are significant steps, not least because Duma ratification is often a game of political roulette rather than a reliable national obligation. Indeed, it has failed to ratify the Siberian overflight agreement reached with the EU, despite signing up to it.

In its behaviour, Russia is clearly both testing the boundaries of Western policy - finding, in the case of the EU, that they are extremely flexible - and safeguarding those it considers important. In other words, within its own perception it is taking a pragmatic approach. The EU should follow this example: pragmatism is far more fruitful than weakness and a basis for coherence. In the absence of a policy, we could do worse - and definitely better than the current situation.

• Ilana Bet-El is an academic, author and policy adviser based in Brussels.

The resurgence of Russia has become a major Western preoccupation - not least because the great bear seems to be rattling bars quite strongly lately: from disputes over missile defence, Polish beef and Lithuanian energy to stand-offs over Transdniestria, Georgia and Kosovo - and there is now also a demand from Russia for an emergency conference on arms control in Europe, which has not stopped it from testing a ballistic missile. Then there is the specific EU-Russia relationship which has been allowing many a pundit and ‘senior official’, in the Union and member states, to reflect on its apparent awfulness.