What next for Turkey and the Cyprus conflict?

Date: 19/12/02

By Natalie Tocci

While Turkey achieved significant success at Copenhagen, a solution for Cyprus still looks far from certain.

At the Copenhagen Summit last week the European Council gave the green light to ten candidate countries to accede to the Union by 1 May, 2004.

The enlargement package included the divided island of Cyprus. With respect to Turkey's candidacy, the 15 converged on a variation of a Franco-German proposal, stating that if the European Council in December 2004 deems that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, it would be invited to begin accession negotiations "without delay".

As far as Turkey's own accession process is concerned, the Copenhagen decision should be considered as one further crucial step bringing Turkey closer to the Union. Yet as far as expectations to reunify Cyprus prior to accession are concerned, some of the momentum generated by the United Nations plan in November may have been lost.

Turkey lobbied intensively for a start of negotiations before the next enlargement in May 2004. It feared that the accession of the ten new members could introduce new obstacles in Turkey's path to the Union. Yet the EU-15's concern that a commitment on Turkey on the eve of enlargement could create tensions with the immediate future members was precisely why consensus was forged around a December 2004 date.

This is not to say that the new member states would necessarily have objections to Turkey's accession. Less still that the December 2004 date was a sinister European ploy to defer indefinitely Turkey's membership by relying on the objections of future members, as was implied by some Turkish policymakers and opinion-shapers.

Rather, the European Council reasoned that committing the EU-25 to a decision taken shortly before by theEU-15 would have sent the wrong signals to the new members on the eve of effective membership.

As far as Turkey's accession process is concerned, Copenhagen should be considered a significant success. Consensus within the Union on the desirability of a new member state, particularly an important yet problematic applicant such as Turkey, does not emerge overnight. It is a gradual process that is established and reinforced over time. The decision in Copenhagen is another crucial instance in a continuing process of consensus formation.

The farther Turkey progresses along this path, notwithstanding the uncertainties that remain, the more irreversible will the accession process become. Moreover, the more Ankara progresses along the path of reform, spurred by Turkish public opinion and the EU anchor, the more will the reluctant voices in Europe be sidelined. Copenhagen, like Helsinki in 1999, should be hailed as another key decision in the long and tortuous road leading Turkey in to Europe.

It is difficult to be equally optimistic for a Cyprus settlement. The Copenhagen summit, while admitting Cyprus to the Union, failed to witness a breakthrough in negotiations on the reunification of the divided island.

On 11 November, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a 137-page plan to settle the Cyprus conflict to Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, as well as to the governments of guarantor states Greece, Turkey and the UK. The plan represents the most comprehensive attempt to reach a settlement, certainly in the last decade, and probably since the 1974 division of the island. While the details of the agreement certainly require negotiation and modification by the principal parties, the general outline of the plan fulfils the basic needs of both communities and the three guarantor states.

After long delays, the UN submitted a second version of the plan, accounting for several objections made by the parties to the first draft. On the basis of this, the UN and the member states hoped for an agreement on the margins of the European Council. On the eve of the Copenhagen Council, the chances of a breakthrough were slim. Both parties were cautious about the compromises entailed in the plan.

The Turkish Cypriot side in particular loudly voiced its objections and was deemed responsible for the long delays in replies. The illness of Denktash following heart surgery in October complicated matters further.

Indeed on 12-13 December, Denktash was in hospital in Ankara rather than negotiating the reunification of the island in Copenhagen.

It was unlikely that his representative Tashin Erturoglu would have signed an agreement in his place.

Sadly yet predictably the Council ended without an agreement. Nonetheless, the presidency conclusions encouraged the continuation of negotiations with the aim of reaching an agreement by 28 February 2003.

Yet with the failure to broker a deal in Copenhagen, the chances of reaching a settlement may have diminished. On 16 December an editorial in the Cyprus Mail posed the poignant question: "What incentive is there now for talks?"

Turkey has received its "date", which may not be as soon or as irrevocable as it would have wished it to be, but it is nonetheless a landmark decision by the 15 that will not be easily reversed. In the short term Turkey does not need to make painful compromises on Cyprus in order to further its own accession process.

Furthermore, the remaining (albeit diminished) ambiguity concerning Turkey's future in the Union also entails that Ankara will have difficulty in accepting a Cyprus settlement in the next two months. It is fundamental to fully comprehend that all Turks (whether pro-EU or not) cannot envisage the futures of Turkey and Cyprus to be indefinitely driven apart. Many Turks accept and understand that because of Turkey's own shortcomings, Cyprus' EU membership will occur prior to Turkey's. However, they do not accept that because of allegedly unchangeable features of the Turkish state and society (such as those recently mentioned by Convention chairman Valéry Giscard d'Estaing), Cyprus will mark the borders of the united Europe, keeping Cyprus and Turkey on opposite sides of the European divide.

Europeans may deride this Turkish position considering it to be the product of an outdated security culture. Yet regardless of any such opinions, the fact remains that while pressure on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots can and should be exerted, pressure alone will not necessarily deliver an agreement in Cyprus.

Faithful to the Helsinki conclusions, the Copenhagen European Council admitted Cyprus to the Union without considering an agreement to be a precondition.

While pressure will no doubt persist, the leverage that EU member states had in Copenhagen has been diluted. In the south of Cyprus, presidential elections are scheduled for February 2003, and according to most, current President Glafcos Clerides is significantly better placed than any possible successor both to negotiate and to sign a future deal.

However, the majority of the Greek Cypriot public is sceptical of the current UN Plan.

As reported in the Greek Cypriot daily Politis, opposition to the plan stands at approximately 64%.

However, while incentives may have diminished, an agreement before an accession treaty is signed remains possible. There are still important reasons why the parties should push for an agreement based on the UN plan. The AKP government in Turkey appears committed to reaching a solution in Cyprus and to pursue a reformist agenda. Their commitment to reform was again indicated by the government's overall positive assessments of the Copenhagen decision. Had the Turkish government not been sincere, it could have easily exploited its frustrated expectations (for an earlier and firmer date) to cool its relations with the Union.

The Turkish government does not deem a non-solution to be a solution, marking a clear break with the rhetoric of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who considered the problem to be solved in 1974, when upon his decision, a Turkish military intervention partitioned the island in response to a Greek military coup.

The Turkish Cypriot people also desperately want a solution and have difficulty in imagining a prosperous future in northern Cyprus under a continuation of the status quo. The Turkish Cypriot people understandably give precedence to security and political equality over economic prosperity. Yet the majority probably considers the UN plan as a way into the Union as political equals to their Greek Cypriot compatriots. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has been considerably more sceptical of the plan; but it has so far not rejected it either. Last but not least, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaderships may recognise that, following the accession of the divided island, a future deal may well be less sensitive to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot concerns.

The Greek Cypriot leadership would also have to think twice before rejecting a solution based on the UN plan. While from a constitutional and economic standpoint the Greek Cypriots have less to gain than the Turkish Cypriots, the UN plan foresees the return of a large portion of territory, the return of 85,000 Greek Cypriot refugees under Greek Cypriot administration, a formal reunification of the island and a considerable reduction in the number of Turkish troops.

Failure to deliver an agreement in the next months could result in the further entrenchment of the green-line, at least as long as Turkey itself remained outside the Union. Given the uncertainties of the future, the current Greek Cypriot leadership may deem the possible costs of non-agreement and the definite gains of an agreement to be high enough to warrant an early settlement.

• Natalie Tocci is a research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. www.ceps.be

Major feature. Author says while Turkey achieved significant success at Copenhagen, a solution for Cyprus still looks far from certain.