What if Iran gets the bomb?

Iran's apparent determination to develop a nuclear weapons capacity is a serious problem both in itself and as another potential source of transatlantic disaccord.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent inflammatory statement, denying Israel's right to exist and calling the Holocaust a myth, heightens international concern. Iran has a revolutionary history, a global ideological agenda and a history of supporting terrorism. Furthermore, its region is inherently unstable. Iran has now indicated that it will resume its atomic energy programme, removing the seals on its plants placed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It continues to reject enrichment in Russia: the key to any military programme is possessing the military know-how.

Nevertheless, the legal case that Iran does not have the right to develop nuclear weapons is dubious. France, the US and the UK have not complied with all their obligations under the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and India, Israel and Pakistan have been allowed to go nuclear.

Iran's quest for nuclear energy is also understandable, despite its extensive oil reserves, as it could still be economically beneficial.

The argument that if Iran were not seeking nuclear weaponry it would have no reason to reject international supervision is equally dubious. The Iranians could reply that the US would not accept such a limit on American sovereignty and Iran has never invaded another country. Yet, if the technology to enrich uranium were to be obtained, there would be no possible future control over Iran acquiring military capacity.

We are faced with several problems when dealing with Iran. We cannot be sure of the facts on the ground. The IAEA believes that Iran is 5-10 years away from producing a nuclear bomb, but others believe the timeframe is much shorter. It is also difficult to understand the true meaning and purpose of statements by Iranian leaders, which must be seen through the prism of domestic politics. The Iranian Republic has both theocratic and democratic elements. There are non-elected institutions which reflect the theocratic element, where sovereignty lies with God. There are also elected institutions: the presidency and parliament.

President Ahmadinejad defers to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who is the most powerful leader. But there is constant manoeuvring between mutating interest groups that are in a permanent state of intrigue. Statements by Iranian leaders cannot be analysed in the same way as statements made by their western counterparts: the same applies to negotiations. The Iranians view negotiations as a game, the object of which is to confuse, upon the correct thesis that Iranians can pick their way through confusion better than westerners can. Two axioms need to be borne in mind: 'Do not confuse movement with progress' and 'Truth is subjective'. Iranians conduct negotiations instinctively rather than strategically. There is a huge gulf between perception and reality, and between rhetoric and action.

Three elements dominate Iranian thinking: mistrust, insecurity and fundamentalism. Trust is virtually non-existent within Iranian society and there is certainly no reason why foreigners should be trusted, having regard to Iranian history - a country extensively exploited without any of the benefits of colonialisation. Unforgettable to the people is the US-organised overthrow of the popular prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 and the maintenance of the Shah on the peacock throne by the US military and CIA, the US support of Iraq when it invaded Iran in 1980, and turning a blind eye to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical warfare against Iranian civilians. The Iranians feel insecure despite the lack of a current threat. America is, by popular belief, the 'Great Satan' and regarded as a direct enemy. Religious fundamentalism is prevalent among Iranian leaders and affects their thinking and their policies.

There are four choices facing the EU and the US: promoting domestic opposition in Iran, military action, economic sanctions and/or incentives or managing the acquisition of nuclear capability.

The current regime is stable and there is no sign that internal opposition is likely to have any effect in the foreseeable future. Military action by the US and/or Israel is not feasible, even given the political will.

The US is already over-extended, permission to over-fly other countries would be needed and the effects on the Islamic world would be calamitous.

General economic sanctions would not be agreed. Targeted 'intelligent' sanctions are possible, but it is difficult to see how they would be effective without the participation of Russia and China. It might be possible to buy Russia's support but China needs Iranian oil. Theoretically, an oil 'security' agreement could be entered into with China but it is hard to imagine this happening in practice.

India is also a key player as Iran is dependent on India for oil refining and gasoline. There would also be serious implications for Turkey, which is dependent on Iran for oil and natural gas. The west has limited economic incentives with which to tempt Iran but those offered so far have been inadequate.

Only the US can offer a security guarantee but it would be impossible to persuade the untrusting Iranians that such a guarantee is bankable. It is clear, however, that no solution is possible without close US- EU co-operation.

If all else fails, the process will simply have to be managed. This means minimising the likelihood of Iran going to the next stage of production and of nuclear arms being used. It is hard to imagine against whom Iran would use such power: an attack on Israel would produce a nuclear retaliation.

The biggest worry is weapons of mass destruction being acquired by terrorists. It is a sobering thought that here the risk is greater and more immediate with Pakistan which is both a nuclear power and at risk from fundamentalist terrorists.

• Stanley Crossick is founding chairman of the European Policy Centre. He writes here in a personal capacity. s.crossick@theepc.be

Major analysis feature in which the author, who is Founding Chairman of the European Policy Centre, says that Iran's apparent determination to develop a nuclear weapons capacity was a serious problem both in itself and as another potential source of transatlantic disaccord.