| Author (Person) | Bower, Helen | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Publisher | ProQuest Information and Learning | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Series Title | In Focus | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Series Details | 23.3.03 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Publication Date | 24/03/2003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Content Type | News, Overview, Topic Guide | In Focus | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Hours after US and British led coalition forces launched a military attack on Iraq, EU leaders gathered in Brussels for the 2003 Spring European Council as efforts to strengthen relations between EU countries and to reinforce the Common Foreign and Security Policy overshadowed the economic and social issues on the agenda. The divided response of EU countries to the Iraq crisis has highlighted all too clearly the inability of the European Union to speak with a united voice on foreign affairs. Moreover, with the next enlargement, scheduled for 2004, increasing the number of individual voices to twenty five, many commentators are beginning to question what future there is for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy? Background - The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy The explicit concept of a European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force on 1 November 1993. It seeks to make the European Union's voice heard on the international stage, expressing the EU's position on armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject linked to the fundamental principles and common values which form the basis of the European Union and which it is committed to defend. The provisions on the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on European Union are devoted specifically to the CFSP. In addition, a new role was created with the appointment of Mr Javier Solana Madariaga as High Representative for the CFSP. The Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on 1 February 2003, further developed the CFSP, in particular increasing the areas which fall under qualified majority voting and enhancing the role of the Political and Security Committee in crisis management operations. The key objectives of CFSP are:
The EU's Member States seeks to pursue these objectives by deciding on common strategies; adopting joint actions and common positions; and strengthening the systematic co-operation between Member States in the conduct of policy. Although the majority of these decisions are taken by unanimity (obligatory for the adoption of decisions with military or defence implications) within the Council, mechanisms to help prevent measures being blocked by a single Member State such as 'constructive abstention' and 'enhanced co-operation' between a minimum of eight Member States have been introduced. In recent months, actions under the CFSP have included joint statements on North Korea's nuclear programme; elections in Pakistan; peace negotiations and the humanitarian situation in Sudan; the situation in Venezuela and restrictive measures against Zimbabwe. Moreover, significant progress has been made on developing the EU's military capability through co-operation with NATO and the EU is set to take over the main peacekeeping role in Macedonia in April 2003. More information on CFSP and the EU's defence policy can be found in European Sources Online's Topic Guides: Background - The Iraq crisis Twelve years since the first Gulf War and after numerous UN resolutions and attempts at weapon inspecting inside Iraq, the question over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and if so what threat this posed to the other countries resurfaced on the international agenda in Autumn 2002. The barring of UN weapons teams from Iraq in 1998, the change of administration in the United States in November 2000 and the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 are all seen as reasons why the Iraq issue rose to the fore once again. In early 2002, the Bush administration announced that it considered Iraq to be part of an "axis of evil" and started calling for a "regime change" in Iraq. On 24 September 2002, the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, presented a dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme to the UK Parliament. The document highlighted the perceived threat posed by Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime - speaking to MEPs about the content of the report, Mr Blair said:
Based on the nature of the perceived threat, Mr. Blair made clear that the UK government believed action now needed to be taken:
Following intensive efforts by the UK government and US administration in the international arena, the two parties tabled a new UN Security Resolution on Iraq that was agreed by unanimity in the United Nations Security Council on 8 November 2002. UN Security Resolution 1441 calls on Iraq to disarm stating that it is in "material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA" and warns that it will "face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations". With American and British troops amassing in the Gulf region, Saddam Hussein agreed on 18 November 2002 to allow UN weapons inspectors to resume inspections in the country. Based on the work of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) teams and officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr Hans Blix and Dr ElBaradei, head of UNMOVIC and IAEA respectively, presented their first report on progress on weapons inspections in Iraq on 27 January 2003. This was followed by two more progress reports on 14 February 2003 and 7 March 2003. It was during this timespan that the UN unanimity demonstrated on 8 November 2002 began to fall apart. While the US, the UK and Spain led those countries who argued that the progress reports proved Saddam's unwillingness to co-operate with the United Nations and reluctance to disarm; France, Russia and Germany led those who maintained that the reports illustrated that the disarmament of Iraq could be achieved by weapons inspections teams. On the one side, the UK and US called for military action, on the other France and Russia called for more time. Despite intensive diplomatic efforts throughout February and March 2003, it appeared that no solution to break the gridlock could be found: whilst all the members of the UN Security Council could agree that Iraq needed to be disarmed no consensus could be found on how to do this. Following the third progress report, the US and the UK tabled a further resolution at the UN Security Council setting a deadline of 17 March 2003 for Iraq to disarm or else face military action. However, this met with stiff opposition from the "anti-war" countries who said they would not agree to a UN resolution that provided "automaticity" for war. As a result, the United Kingdom amended the draft resolution to include six tests that the Iraq regime would have to meet but this too was rejected by France and Russia. In a further step, France said it would use its veto at the UN Security Council on any resolution that sought to use military action in Iraq. The French move effectively led to the breakdown of the diplomatic process and while some analysts suggested that the US and the UK might still seek a vote on the second resolution in the UN Security Council since a majority vote in favour would strengthen their case for military action, they ultimately decided to withdraw the draft resolution. On 20 March 2003, the US and British led coalition forces launched a military attack on Iraq, that was without UN backing, with the explicit aims of "disarming Iraq and freeing its people". CFSP and the Iraq Crisis "The European Union is divided; the Security Council is in stalemate. Those are heavy casualties of a war in which a shot has yet to be fired" said Robin Cook, the leader of the House of Commons and the former UK foreign minister as he made a statement to fellow MEPs after resigning from the British government on 17 March 2003 because he could not support the decision to use force to disarm Iraq without UN backing. It is a view that has been echoed by many in recent weeks as hopes of strengthening the EU's CFSP in the future have disintegrated in the face of such a divided response from EU Member States to the Iraq crisis. The position of the United Kingdom and Spain has been clear, the voice of France and Germany has been heard, but where has the EU been in all of this? Ultimately it seems to have been unable to present a united front because its Member States have their own national interests and positions, which have prevailed. The divisions within the European Union have been all too clear although at the outset of the diplomatic crisis, the EU did issue a common position on Iraq following an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Brussels on 17 February 2003. The proposal was put forward jointly by a proposal put forward by the French, UK and Belgian governments. The common position stated that the EU's objective remained 'full and effective disarmament' but added that 'force should only be used as a last resort'. Although commentators suggested that it was once again reflective of the "lowest common denominator" it was certainly an achievement in the light of events that were to follow. Following the summit, the French President, Jacques Chriac, launched a critical tirade on the EU's candidate countries for daring to show support for the United States in a joint statement issued by the Vilnius group of countries, calling their behaviour "childish and dangerous". The French President even implied that the accession of the candidate countries could have been threatened by their actions since all the current EU Member States have yet to ratify the enlargement. Then as the diplomatic crisis escalated the deterioration in relations between the United Kingdom and France - two of the leading members of the EU - worsened. The state of relations was a far cry from the mood at the Le Touquet summit in February 2003 when Blair and Chirac agreed to pool military resources and to ensure that they had one battle-ready aircraft carrier group at sea at all times. As European leaders gathered for the Spring European Council in Brussels on 20 March 2003 the tensions between the two Member States was all too clear. Yet in a positive attempt to limit the negative press that the EU's CFSP has received, the Greek Presidency decided to focus on the rebuilding of Iraq once the conflict is over. European leaders agreed to provide 20 million euros in immediate humanitarian aid for Iraq and to consider providing a further 100 million euros in the future although France refused to discuss the huge task of post-war economic reconstruction. They also managed to reach agreement on a common declaration asserting their commitment to the full and effective disarmament of the country. The main points of the statement are:
In addition, the declaration also explicitly states the determination of the EU's Member States "to strengthen the capacity of the European Union in the context of the CFSP". What future for the CFSP? Despite the statement, no-one in Brussels tried to hide the fact that huge rifts have emerged in the EU as a result of the Iraq issue that will not be bridged overnight. As John Palmer, Director of the European Policy Centre in Brussels, commented:
However, the Iraq crisis comes at a time when the European Union is in the midst of discussing its future with the establishment of a Convention on the Future of Europe and several working groups dedicated to specific policy areas. Whilst Valery Giscard d'Estaing announced on 17 March 2003 that work on drafting of a possible EU constitution will have to be delayed to allow for a greater debate on foreign policy issues this should provide the occasion for real progress to be made. Clearly, the main issue is that "national interests" prioritise over "European interests" and this is unlikely to change but several suggestions have been made about how the EU's CFSP could be strengthened: an end to the rotating presidency of the Council; a seat for the EU on the UN Security Council; a merging of the roles of the EU's High Representative for CFSP and the European Commissioner for External Relations. Ultimately the draft constitution aims to entrust the EU with the "competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy" where "member states shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" and "shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to undermine its effectiveness." The opportunity for developing a stronger CFSP, better equipped to tackling crises like Iraq in the future, is clearly there but it now depends on whether the EU's Member States can overcome their differences or whether a common foreign policy is left out of the treaty altogether. Further information within European Sources Online:
Helen Bower 23 March 2003 The deep divisions between EU govenrment about the tackling of the crisis in Iraq has highlighted the weaknesses of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. |
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| Subject Categories | Politics and International Relations | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Countries / Regions | Middle East | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
