Was the EU ‘missing in action’ in Lebanon war?

For French President Jacques Chirac, Europe has been "too absent" from the Lebanese crisis, he told the annual gathering of French ambassadors in Paris on 28 August. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana should have been give a mandate to "speak and act" on behalf of the 25 member states in the same way as he handles the Iran nuclear dossier, he said. This would enable Europe to "mobilise its strength in the service of peace", Chirac claimed.

With these words, Chirac appeared to be joining the chorus of criticism which concluded that the EU had only played a marginal role in ending the conflict. But when Chirac chooses to criticise the EU for failing to do something, it is often in order to find a scapegoat for France’s political and diplomatic difficulties.

The president’s comments distract attention from the central role that France played in securing at least a temporary end to the fighting and the surprising effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy actors and mechanisms.

Chirac’s criticisms and call for a stronger role for Solana fail to ring true because it is hard to imagine that a French president would have stood back and allowed the EU’s foreign policy chief to negotiate the wording of the United Nations resolution 1701 on the ceasefire. It was France’s historical links with Lebanon as well as its rejection, shared with the US, of Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs that gave it the clout to negotiate with the US.

This illustrates an important point in EU foreign policy and a fallacy that Chirac, on a rhetorical level at least, seems in danger of falling for: the idea that it should stand in for national foreign policy.

For EU foreign policy officials, the fact that UK Prime Minister Tony Blair had the standing to go to the White House to discuss the conflict with President George W. Bush while the French and German foreign ministers were quick to visit the region is a sign of the Union’s strength. "Of course when it comes to sensitive issues [like the Middle East], capitals will assert themselves. It’s only right and proper," says one diplomat. Another diplomat says that the question which should be asked is "what would you be able to do if you only had Solana and the [EU] presidency?".

Member states will inevitably have different roles to play and interests in their dealings with the various regional actors. The point of EU foreign policy is to amplify the Union’s effectiveness by agreeing a common position and co-ordination countries’ responses while sticking to that line.

Officials stress that while much media attention focused on the divisions among EU states’ positions on the timing of calling for a ceasefire in late July and early August, the splits were far less damaging than over the invasion of Iraq in 2003. "It’s been good compared to Iraq where we were divided throughout. There have been different accents, for example between the UK and France, but within certain parameters," says one official.

Rejecting suggestions that the EU appeared divided and marginalised over the crisis, diplomats insist that the structures and procedures that the EU has set up to handle foreign policy issues have worked well over the last two months. In particular, they highlight the role the Political and Security Committee (PSC) played on co-ordinating policy and in particular member states’ contributions to the peacekeeping force. "Compared to 1999 we have the PSC which was able to meet as often as necessary," says one Finnish presidency official.

While Solana may not have had the highest profile during the crisis, he was one of the first to visit the region once hostilities broke out and once the UN resolution was agreed. Officials say that the co-ordination between Solana and Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, in particular in dealing with regional actors, worked very well thanks to regular communications.

While there has been criticism of delays in the EU committing its contribution to the force, with France and other participants wanting to address concerns about the rules of engagement, diplomats point out that at worst the EU only experienced a delay of two weeks in assembling its contribution. "That’s a respectable period," says one diplomat, pointing out that contributions to other EU missions such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo have taken much longer.

The Commission also emerged well from the crisis in dealing with the evacuation of EU and other nationals and in delivering humanitarian aid rapidly.

Given that some of the further changes to the EU’s foreign policy envisaged in the Union’s stalled constitution (such as a single foreign minister replacing Solana and the commissioner for external relations, an end to the rotating presidency and a European diplomatic service) are a long way off coming being implemented, officials believe that the handling of the crisis was "as good as we could expect" with the current set-up. While some believe that the crisis highlights the need to get rid of the rotating six-month presidency of EU because of the greater continuity it would bring to the EU figures dealing with regional actors, other point out that the changes foreseen by the constitution would have had little effect in dealing with the crisis because the text did not change the rules for decision-making in foreign policy, which remain under unanimity. This consensus-based approach is essential, officials argue. Otherwise the Brussels structures would simply be by-passed by national capitals, they maintain, leading to less, not more effectiveness in the foreign policy field.

In judging how the EU has acquitted itself in dealing with this diplomatic emergency, it would be wrong to assume that a united stance by the Union would have been sufficient to prevent or halt the fighting, driven as it was by long-standing political grievances. As one diplomat points out: "People expect an instant and final solution for the Middle East but there hasn’t been one for the last 60 years."

For French President Jacques Chirac, Europe has been "too absent" from the Lebanese crisis, he told the annual gathering of French ambassadors in Paris on 28 August. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana should have been give a mandate to "speak and act" on behalf of the 25 member states in the same way as he handles the Iran nuclear dossier, he said. This would enable Europe to "mobilise its strength in the service of peace", Chirac claimed.