Voters break off the Union’s engagement

Date: 09/06/05

Last week's referenda on the EU's constitutional treaty showed that the French and Dutch people are far less happy with the Union's enlargement than their politicians believed, writes Andrew Beatty

Claims by French President Jacques Chirac that enlargement ended "the artificial division of Europe" are manifestly untrue. This, after all, was the treaty destined to make a united Europe work, and it was emphatically rejected by the French and the Dutch citizens.

The Berlin Wall may have collapsed, but a new ideological divide threatens to replace it. Many in the EU's founding member states are unhappy with the capitalisme sauvage blowing in from Anglo-Saxon (not to mention Gaelic, Baltic and Slavic) shores. Parisians would rather get their toilet fixed by an 'old' EU plumber than his or her Polish counterpart.

Whether this divide deepens or fades away will in large part be decided by the debate that will now start on the future of the Union.

The limits of EU enlargement are clearly coming into view. While Brussels strategists might welcome Turkish membership to discredit talk of a 'clash of civilisations' or advocate membership as a method of putting the Balkans on a stable footing once and for all, voters appear to have no such compunctions.

Social protection and national identity matter more.

For a host of countries on the EU's borders the spectre of a Brussels curtain separating EU-Europe and non-EU Europe has been raised.

For the countries of the Western Balkans, particularly Croatia and Macedonia, who are waiting for the go-ahead to start membership talks, it may not be the end of the story. It is likely that the bar will be raised, though, meaning they would endure longer negotiations, with the EU keen on making sure that they have fully implemented everything they have promised to do.

For Turkey the picture is much bleaker, particularly if Angela Merkel becomes the new German chancellor after the September elections. Merkel and her party, the Christian Democrat Union, oppose Turkish EU membership and advocate a special partnership with Ankara instead.

The future is also uncertain for Ukraine, but geopolitical calculations mean Kiev is likely to push ahead with reforms in the hope that one day the tide of EU public opinion will shift.

For those further away from membership, but who could conceivably join one day, such as Belarus, Albania, Georgia, Armenia or Azerbaijan, a little of the EU's much vaunted magnetism has been deactivated and with it the ability of Brussels to press for reforms and embolden reformers.But last week's referenda have also thrown up one paradox which may have profound ramifications for the future of the EU's foreign policy.

Although opinion polls show that citizens want a stronger Europe on the world stage, a policy of engagement, which in its deepest form takes the form of accession, is naturally based on EU expansion.

Much of what the EU does around the world is exporting its own experience of integration.

Brussels asks Algeria, Israel or Russia to improve human rights, bring their legislation in line with its own and do what it asked Poland and the other candidates to do a decade ago, despite the fact that these countries express little interest or have no prospect to join the Union.

Even in Iran the EU is offering deeper trade links, partial access to its internal market, in return for Tehran abandoning its nuclear programme. Offering trade and investment to these countries entails the EU fashion of open and liberal policies.

Modern engagement means leveraging ever-higher levels of economic and political interdependency and gaining concessions on human rights, political reforms and further economic opportunities. But it is precisely this interconnectedness and liberalism that some Dutch and most French voters sought to reject.

In the end confidence in the EU's competitiveness may be the deciding factor.

Two years ago a European Commission poll showed that 47% of French respondents thought that the intensification of globalisation would be detrimental to their family. In Ireland, with optimism and confidence borne from a booming economy, 66% of respondents though that globalisation was a good thing. Low confidence in one's ability to take advantage of change will inevitably mean resistance to change.

As a recent report from the UK-based Foreign Policy Centre points out, the EU's ability to pursue a policy of engagement has clearly defined limits; lack of political commitment to engagement is certainly one of these.

As EU leaders prepare to discuss what kind of Europe citizens want to have, a debate on the implications for a policy of engagement is needed.

Author suggests that the negative referenda on the EU's Constitutional Treaty showed that Europeans were far less happy with the European Union's enlargement and its international engagement than their politicians believed.