Veto players and decision-making in the EU after Nice: Policy stability and bureaucratic/judicial discretion

Abstract:

The Treaty of Nice introduced a triple majority requirement for Council decisions. In order to be valid, Council decisions require not only a qualified majority (slightly larger than before), but also an absolute majority of Member States and, at a country”s request, a 62 per cent majority of the total population of EU countries. We explain why this significant modification of the rules occurred and what the likely consequences are. The triple majority requirement was introduced because the approaching enlargement of the EU differentiates for the first time between the three majoritarian criteria (weighted votes in the Council, majority of countries, and majority of the population). Different countries have insisted on each of these criteria and the final outcome is an explicit incorporation of all three. The likely outcomes of this change in rules are increased difficulty of legislative decisions, a shift of veto powers in favour of the Council, an increased role for the judiciary, and a further bureaucratisation of the EU