Turkey. A revolution, of sorts

Date: 02/08/03

Taming the generals, and knocking at Europe's door

THIS week Turkey's government, led by Tayyip Erdogan, put two hugely potent bills through parliament. One should dramatically weaken the power of the generals, who, as proclaimed guardians of the country's secular constitution, have long been accustomed to interfere in politics, thereby mocking Turkey's claim to be a thorough-going democracy. The other bill offers a qualified amnesty to the rump of a Kurdish guerrilla force that, until a ceasefire in 1999, was fighting a vicious war in the country's south-east, which in turn was partly responsible for Turkey's dreadful record of human-rights abuse. Both bills are the latest striking signal that the country is determined to revamp its entire system of governance in order to qualify, some day, for membership of the European Union.

But the road towards that goal remains very rocky. A slow realisation that a new world order has emerged since America's invasion of Iraq, together with the approach of a crunch moment in a year or so in the long campaign to join the EU, means that the government is still facing one of the hardest tests since Kemal Ataturk replaced the Ottoman sultans some eight decades ago with his version of a secular and authoritarian state that has more or less survived until now. But the legacy of Ataturk, the great moderniser, has itself become a brake on continuing modernisation and must steadily be refashioned or discarded - a notion that would have been deemed sacrilege barely a decade ago. Indeed, it remains a crime to insult his name.

Three new challenges stand out. First, to qualify for EU membership, Turkey must still implement a bevy of drastic reforms, including those enacted this week, entailing changes in its approach to individual rights that will alter the very nature of the bossy Turkish state. Second, linked to that change, a new relationship between government at the centre and Turkey's large Kurdish minority may require a redefinition of Turkish identity and may even lead in the end to an unprecedented measure of devolution, though few people dare to contemplate it yet. Third, the upheavals next-door in Iraq mean that Turkey must rethink its role as a regional power broker.

The most immediate foreign-policy question for the government is whether to send Turkish troops into Iraq under American overall command - on the understanding that they would have to help keep the peace in the south and not in Kurdish northern Iraq where they would be unwelcome. The Turkish government would much prefer to go in under a UN umbrella. Yet, if that is not (yet) available, it would be loth to turn down the chance to display its readiness to help Turkey's American allies and to repair relations that were sorely damaged, just before the recent invasion of Iraq, when Turkey's parliament refused to give permission for American troops to use eastern Turkey as a launch-pad for a second front. In any event, Turks as a whole have remained strongly opposed to American policy over Iraq and many of Mr Erdogan's Justice and Development Party, as well as the opposition, share those feelings.

Since the government took office last November, it has on the whole done quite well, despite some hiccups. A big advantage over its predecessors, many of which were rancorous and fragile push-me-pull-you coalitions, is that it has a huge majority in parliament, a good four more years in which to make wrenching economic, human-rights and judicial changes, and an unusual font of goodwill at home and abroad. But it is inexperienced, torn by conflicting pressures (notably in foreign policy), and already has a squad of trouble-makers in its ranks. In addition, Turkey's economy, though recovering pluckily from a financial crash two-and-a-half years ago thanks partly to the watchful eye - and massive loans - of the IMF, is still very frail.

Secret Islamist schemes?

Moreover, the ruling party's Islamist roots, albeit disavowed by its current leaders, still make many Turks queasy, especially in commercial and liberal-leaning circles in Istanbul, their greatest city. Many still suspect that Mr Erdogan has a “secret Islamist agenda” which he would like to enact once he has consolidated his hold on the state, pushed the generals into the shade, and got the cover of the European Union for protection. Such worries make many of the country's generals even twitchier; indeed, it is not yet certain they will accept the trimming of their power.

The generals' two biggest bugbears have long been Muslim fundamentalism (from which Mr Erdogan's party is now so keen to distance itself) and Kurdish separatism that might, if it grew stronger, prompt the break-up of the once-much-grander Turkish state. Many generals are particularly nervous about the emergence of a Kurdish quasi-state next-door in Iraq and the dawning realisation of Turkey's own Kurds, probably at least 14m-strong in a total population of nearly 70m, that they may soon be able to enjoy much greater freedom thanks largely to the EU's insistence on minority rights.

This week's clutch of reforms, the seventh in a series of so-called “harmonisation packages” designed to bring Turkey into line with its would-be EU partners, would, among other things, revamp the powerful National Security Council, where the generals have predominated, and make it an entirely advisory body.

The previous government started enacting the EU harmonisation bills, but Mr Erdogan's team has sharply raised the tempo. In parliament's next session, it may even have to amend chunks of the Turkish constitution, still largely inspired by Ataturk and last refashioned at the generals' behest in 1982. This, too, would mark a seismic change.

The government has already pushed through a string of laws that should much improve prisoners' rights - and make it far less likely, in the first place, that Turks are prosecuted for crimes of self-expression which have habitually been deemed by judges to abet terrorism or undermine the secular state. Arguing, for instance, for Kurdish language rights has often been considered to breach laws forbidding Turks from encouraging the break-up of their state. On that account alone, thousands have, over the years, been jailed.

The biggest blot on Turkey's human-rights record has been the prevalence of torture in prisons and police stations. Foreign and domestic human-rights watchers are cautiously hopeful, thanks to a variety of laws included in the packages already passed, that this dire practice will gradually cease. But the mantra, intoned by politicians, diplomats and human-rights campaigners alike, is that laws are one thing, implementation quite another. So far, very few miscreants have actually been brought to book. Fundamental change on the ground is not yet plainly evident.

Words versus deeds

Indeed, the panoply of repressive laws is so far-reaching and complex that even the best-informed politicians and lawyers find it hard to identify which laws and articles have been swept away and which could still be invoked. Moreover, much still depends on the regulatory bodies - the broadcasting watchdog, for instance - and the judges and prosecutors who oversee and interpret the supposed rules.

Again and again, liberal-minded Turks inveigh against the enduring “mentality of the state” and the reluctance of the old guard - bureaucratic, judicial and military - to respect individual rights, whatever the law may say. “The culture of impunity [for state organs] and the culture of denial [of past wrongs] is still so strong,” sighs a wary western diplomat. Many ordinary Turks think it doesn't matter much what the law-book says: if the generals and judges are determined, they can still always get round it. “It's not the rule of law, it's still the law of the ruler,” says another sceptical foreign observer.

Corruption on a colossal scale is the most obvious manifestation of this age-old abuse of power. It may be the single biggest reason for the relative failure of Turkey to keep up with countries, such as Spain, that had a similar per capita GDP half a century ago. Mr Erdogan's party was elected (with 34% of votes cast, almost twice as many as its nearest rival got) largely because it was thought to be clean. Its ability to govern alone, along with the prospect that the usual merry-go-round of ruling coalitions sharing out patronage and spoils has stopped, has raised hopes that it will stay clean, though some doubts have begun to creep in. The recent setting up of a parliamentary committee to investigate corruption is a good sign.

Government ministers know that, even if, as is fairly likely, the European Union's monitors issue a laudatory progress report this October, it will be even more crucial to Turkey's chances of joining the club that the array of new laws enacted in the past year is seen to be vigorously implemented in the ensuing year. The Turks' high hope is that, provided further progress is plain, a date will be given so that formal negotiations to join the EU may start at the very end of next year.

How soon after that, realistically speaking, might Turkey actually join? “Maybe in three, five or eight years,” says a minister. The eight years of negotiations that Spain needed is often mentioned. So mark possible entry down as 2015 - with a lot of luck. But before that target can be reached, a sea-change in the national psyche has to take place. Recent changes, at least on paper, are dramatic. But they are only a start.

Taming the generals, and knocking at Europe's door.