To Adopt or Not to Adopt: Explaining Selective Rule Transfer under the European Neighbourhood Policy

The dominant explanation for limited rule transfer under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is its weak incentive structure, in particular the absence of a membership perspective. However, a certain rule transfer has occurred, albeit in a strikingly selective and uneven way. This article formulates an alternative model for explaining the variance in rule transfer under the ENP. Refuting conditionality and asymmetrical interdependence as having insufficient explanatory value, rule transfer is explained on the basis of three interrelated factors. First, the usefulness of ENP provisions for domestic agendas. Secondly, the process of active legitimacy-seeking with the EU, driven by the subjective perception of accession prospects. Thirdly, the institutional design of the ENP itself, in particular its differentiated approach and lack of finality, which give the policy a strong political character.