Time running out for détente in Cyprus

Date: 08/05/02

A new 'partnership state' in Cyprus would be good for the island and for the EU, writes Ergün Olgun,

FACE to face negotiations are actively under way in Cyprus in the shadow of the European Union enlargement timetable. To some, the timetable is a catalyst for the resolution of the long-standing Cyprus conflict. For others, time is ticking away towards a crisis.

There is a lot of speculation about the likely consequences and costs involved if the so-called catalytic effect of the European Union fails to bring about the desired result, and instead triggers a crisis.

In their recent article entitled Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis, for example, Henri Barkey and Philip Gordon argue that the 'seemingly unstoppable progress of Cyprus' EU accession runs into the equally determined Turkish and Turkish Cypriot unwillingness...to acquiesce in Cypriot accession'.

Nathalie Tocci, research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, in a recent paper called Cyprus and the European Union: Catalysing Crisis or Settlement?, concludes that 'the EU's expected catalytic effect...seems to have failed...the failure is caused by a fundamentally misconceived policy of conditionality.

'First, conditional incentives offered to the Turkish Cypriots are not valuable enough...furthermore, EU membership would actually represent a security threat to the Turkish Cypriots who would be cut off from Turkey until the latter's uncertain EU membership. Second, conditional incentives to Turkey are not credible enough for it to alter its stance. Third...the removal of conditional incentives to the Greek Cypriots since 1994-1995 seriously reduced their incentives to compromise.

'Given the RoC's [Republic of Cyprus'] increased power within the Union post membership and the absence of EU conditionality regarding settlement of the conflict, the Greek Cypriot leaders should bid for time and await EU membership before pushing for a settlement.'

Surprisingly, there is hardly any talk about the objective requirements for the win-win sustainable resolution of the Cyprus dispute - a dispute between the two equal ex-partners of the failed 1960 Partnership Republic of Cyprus.

Carl Bildt attempted to address the issue of objective requirements in the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), another case of a failed partnership, when he presented his ideas in To Prepare for Peace - Towards Self-Sustaining Stability in the Balkans in September 2000.

He wrote: 'It is absolutely pivotal that we seek political frameworks that are perceived by each and everyone as being stable and secure. Otherwise there will be no stability.'

Considering the existing division and mistrust between the polities of the FRY, and with the purpose of preventing future violence and disintegration, he suggested that Kosovo be equipped with the same degree of sovereignty that can be foreseen for the republics of Serbia and Montenegro in a future arrangement. The satisfaction of the perceived legitimate rights and status of antagonists, as well as the satisfaction of collective psychological needs such as dignity, are crucial in the resolution of conflicts of the type seen in the FRY and Cyprus.

This week, the Turkish Cypriot side has conveyed outline ideas to the Greek Cypriot side covering the whole range of core issues for a viable settlement.

The package includes ideas to settle issues such as security, Union membership, property, territory, political-economic harmonisation and the objective legal procedures needed to establish the new Partnership State of Cyprus, as well as, of course, ideas covering the institutional makeup of the proposed new partnership and the competences to be assigned to it.

Accordingly, the new partnership state will have effective legislative, executive, and judicial functions, and will possess single international legal personality.

The partnership state will reflect and recognise the equal status of its two constituent partners. Both will support the membership of the new partnership state in the EU, subject to approval in separate referenda and to the maintenance of the balance between Turkey and Greece vis-à-vis their relations with the partnership state.

The partnership state will be sovereign to the extent defined in its founding agreement. Residual powers will rest with the two constituent partner states.

The competences of the institutions of the partnership state will include external relations and relations with the European Union.

The Turkish Cypriot side has also proposed the inclusion of a provision to prohibit any unilateral change in the terms of the settlement. Turkey, Greece and Great Britain, under the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, would safeguard the new state of affairs created by the establishment of the new partnership state.

The erroneous removal of conditionality on the Greek Cypriot side to resolve the Cyprus dispute prior to EU membership has unfortunately deprived the Greek Cypriot leadership of any sense of urgency and need to constructively work towards a mutually acceptable resolution of the Cyprus issue.

This is why the Greek Cypriot side is preoccupied with the demonisation of Turkish Cypriot ideas or proposals.

It is thus no surprise that George Vassiliou, the head of the negotiating team for the accession of South Cyprus in the European Union, stated at a briefing at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. on 8 April 8 that 'the reason for the lack of progress until now was the fact that [Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf] Denktash - with the support of Turkey, of course - insisted on the idea of two separate sovereign states.'

This is surely aimed at distorting the true intent of Turkish Cypriot proposals. Contrary to Vassiliou's assertion, the Turkish Cypriot side has, in good faith, offered that the existing polities on the island transform themselves into constituent partner states in favour of the new partnership state of Cyprus.

This would have equalised the legitimacy and status of the two constituting parties in the process leading to the establishment of the new partnership state.

No doubt Vassiliou and other Greek Cypriot leaders know the difference between two separate sovereign states and the Turkish Cypriot proposal.

Surely, both peoples in the Island have a lot to gain from a mutually acceptable resolution, given the anticipated security, stability and economic benefits to be drawn from it.

The achievement of a voluntary settlement in Cyprus would also deepen Turkish-Greek détente; strengthen the pivotal role they can jointly play in the region; help the Turkish-European convergence process; and foster regional security and stability.

The EU itself would be among the primary beneficiaries. The resolution of the Cyprus issue would not only facilitate enlargement but also contribute to Europe's own security and stability needs, as well as its Mediterranean policies.

The Helsinki European Council had concluded that although a political settlement will facilitate the accession of 'Cyprus' to the EU, this would not be a precondition, though in doing this 'the Council will take account of all relevant factors'.

The concern of the Greek Cypriot side is the last provision of the Helsinki conclusion. Their current strategy is thus aimed at misrepresenting and demonising Turkish Cypriot proposals so that they can overcome the last hurdle in getting the so-called Republic of Cyprus accepted in the EU before settlement.

Whether this is done with the proviso that the acquis communautaire would temporarily apply only in areas controlled by the Greek Cypriot government makes no difference.

With the additional political leverage in the hand of Greek Cypriots following EU membership, the establishment of a new partnership state based on the sovereign equality of the two parties will become an impossibility.

This is why the Turkish Cypriot side has been stressing that there is a real opportunity to resolve the Cyprus issue now; that this could be the last chance to establish a new partnership state, and that this option would be abandoned by the Turkish Cypriot side if the membership of the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus is realised on behalf of the whole island.

It should not be forgotten that the main systemic obstacle in establishing a new partnership state in Cyprus is the existing power asymmetry between the two equal ex-partners of the 1960 bi-communal Partnership of Cyprus.

This power asymmetry would only widen, as the indications already demonstrate, if the Greek Cypriot side is admitted into the EU with the claim that they are the sole legitimate representatives of the whole island.

EU policymakers should look at the facts, the needs of self-sustaining resolution in Cyprus, the real intentions and desires of the two parties and Europe's own medium to long-term interests linked to the region, before passing judgment on 'all the relevant factors' regarding Cyprus.

• The author is undersecretary to President Rauf Denktash of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Major feature. Author, who is undersecretary to President Rauf Denktash of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, says a new 'partnership state' in Cyprus would be good for the island and for the EU.