Author (Person) | Giovannetti, Emanuele, Stallibrass, David |
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Publisher | Taylor & Francis |
Series Title | European Competition Journal |
Series Details | Volume 5, Number 3, Pages 641-654 |
Publication Date | September 2009 |
ISSN | 1744-1056 |
Content Type | Journal Article |
Introduction: "Vertical agreements in general, and resale price maintenance (RPM) in particular, can be used both in a pro-competitive way by improving efficiencies and facilitating entry into new markets, and in an anticompetitive way by blocking new entrants, restoring monopoly profits, dampening competition or facilitating collusion. One element stands out when assessing this crucial trade-off in determining the likely impact on competition, and finally on consumers, of vertical restraints in general: the importance of the market context. The presence of effective upstream competition helps the pro- competitive and efficiency effects of vertical restraints. On the other hand, anticompetitive effects are more likely when upstream competition is weak and there are barriers to entry at either the producer or distributor level. For collusive
anticompetitive effects to be a threat it is necessary that suppliers or retailers form a tight oligopoly such that RPM is applied by all or many of them."
"In the next section, section B, we provide a brief summary of UK and EC law, and a comparison with that of the US. In section C we review some recent developments in the relevant economic literature before linking them, in section D, to some recent RPM cases in the UK. Section E derives suggestions towards an economic-based prioritisation process for dealing with RPM complaints. Section F concludes the paper."
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Source Link | Link to Main Source https://doi.org/10.5235/ecj.v5n3.641 |
Subject Categories | Internal Markets |
Subject Tags | Competition Law | Policy, Prices |