The structural-informational power of business: credibility, signalling and the UK banking reform process

Abstract:

This article seeks to provide a better understanding of why business power varies over time and between firms. It assumes that business influence derives from firms’ ability to send credible information signals about policy costs, causing policy-makers to amend proposals.

This ‘structural-informational’ power is mediated by two factors. First, the structure of the policy process enables policy-makers to assess the credibility of industry claims through institutional screening mechanisms, which vary over time. Second, the influence of individual firms is dependent on anticipated policy costs and past reputational damage, leading them to pursue different signalling strategies to maximize credibility.

These claims are illustrated using the case study of United Kingdom banking reform between 2010 and 2013. Structural-informational power helps to explain why bank ‘ring-fencing’ reforms were agreed in the face of powerful industry opposition, but also why specific banks were subsequently able to extract important policy concessions.