The principal-agent approach to EU studies: Apply liberally but handle with care

Abstract: As the title suggests, the overarching finding of this symposium is that the principal-agent approach is highly salient for EU scholars, but that it must be handled with care. Together the papers demonstrate that agency theory is relevant not only for understanding instances in which authority has been explicitly delegated to supranational agents but also for analysing cases in which supranational agent's role in EU policy-making is more complex or of secondary importance. At the same time, the principal-agent approach suffers from some serious methodological limitations. The legal dimension of principal-agent relationships is often under-articulated in studies of EU policy-making, as is the relationship between the EU and international organizations. Other concerns relate to the lack of criteria for choosing one specification of a principal-agent relationship over other conceivable alternatives and the difficulties of identifying a specific explanation for agency slack in the presence of many possible explanations.