The painful EU-Russia summit in Rome

Date: 13/11/03

Berlusconi's gaffe and Putin's evasion characterized a summit based on pretence, argues Michael Emerson

THOSE who have read the communiqué and transcript of the press conference of the latest EU-Russia summit in Rome on 6 November may not be sure whether to laugh or cry.

Those who prefer the former may recall the old Soviet joke, in which the worker says "we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us". In Rome, the EU pretended to be constructing a set of common European policy spaces with Russia, and Russia pretended to be converging on common European values.

Silvio Berlusconi, in his capacity as president of the EU, also contributed jokes. He appointed himself as Russian President Vladimir Putin's "unrequested attorney" to defend his client against attacks in the media over Chechnya and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former boss of oil company Yukos who is being held on fraud charges, which many suspect are politically motivated. Berlusconi warned Putin that he would bill him for his services, at the rate of one euro. Putin said that he was willing to pay.

Berlusconi was also laughable when he unwisely chose to take up the Moldova-Transdniestria question, about which he obviously knew nothing, rather than leaving it to Romano Prodi, Javier Solana or Chris Patten who know exactly what is at stake there. Berlusconi said that the current "governors and rulers of Moldova . . . feel that this arsenal [of 1,500 Russian troops and much stored weaponry] should not be removed from their territory". Of course the Moldova government does not want Russian troops removed from its secessionist territory of Transdniestria, whose rotten regime is being effectively protected by Russia.

Those who find all this no joke at all can turn to the summit communiqué, which identifies no less than four common European policy spaces.

So what are they, and are they interesting?

The Common European Economic Space (CEES) was originally announced two years ago. This summit was set as the deadline for adopting a "concept". It sounds from the name that this should be something of great interest to the business community and economists.

The concept paper defines the CEES as "an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia, based on the implementation of common or compatible rules and regulations, including compatible administrative practices, as a basis for synergies and economies of scale associated with a higher degree of competition in bigger markets".

This will focus on four main areas of economic activity: trade in goods, trade in services, establishment and operation of companies and relevant aspects of the movement of persons.

There is nothing precise or binding in this. The businessman has no new information for his planning, and the economist has no new parameters for his calculations. While the paper states that the CEES will be broader and deeper than theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) or the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement provisions, the text does not say how, nor even mention the idea of free trade. And Russia is still not in the WTO.

Second, the common space of freedom, security and justice is about people-to-people contacts, and cooperation against organized crime. There is work under way looking at the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term perspective and, for the short-run, the "existing flexibilities" within the Schengen system. For the EU, a readmission agreement with Russia is one essential condition. We also learn that Russia signed an agreement with Europol, the European law enforcement agency. So this second space looks much fresher than the vague litany on the economic space.

Third, the common space of external security looks forward to the EU and Russia being "partners in security, crisis- management and international relations". There is a further annex resolving strengthened dialogue. But there are no joint actions. It is here that Berlusconi's gaffe over Moldova is so painful. If the EU and Russia cannot resolve the mega- issues of Afghanistan and Iraq, they could at least cooperate towards conflict resolution in the overlapping "near abroads" of the wider Europe, notably in Moldova and the southern Caucasus. But here, Putin is being evasive. The EU could contribute decisively, yet cooperatively with Russia, to settle the Transdniestria affair and help a reunified Moldova hitch on to the south-east European integration train. The forthcoming foreign ministers' meeting, to be hosted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at Maastricht on 1-2 December, should mark a step along this path, which the Dutch OSCE presidency! will try to prepare.

Fourth and finally, there is to be a common space of research, education and culture. This is excellent, as long as it acquires a critical mass. The summit welcomed Russia's accession to the Bologna process, which is a Council of Europe initiative in this area.

But the irony here is that the Council of Europe's existence is not mentioned, and moreover there is the conspicuous absence of commitment to a fifth common space of democracy and human rights, which should be the most important of all.

When the EU looks for Russia to transform itself as far as possible in line with European norms, this means transparency, reliability and predictability in the functioning law-based democracy. Of course, it is here that Putin is doing the reverse in the Khodorkovsky affair.

Berlusconi's final act this year should be to wind up the intergovernmental conference, which should at last scrap the European Council's six-monthly rotating presidency, and which has been producing such erratic and egocentric performances. Thank God at least for that.

• Michael Emerson is senior research fellow at the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies think-tank. www.ceps.be

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/index_en.htm http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/index_en.htm

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