The impact of subnational interests on supranational regulation

This article assesses the influence of subnational interests on supranational regulation within the broader effort of the European Union (EU) to include diffuse interests in the policy process. It tracks 60 legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission between 1996 and 2007 and estimates the change made in response to the requests of the body representing decentralized interests - the Committee of the Regions. It finds that the Commission responds favorably to requests more than a third of the time and that substate politicians are more influential on proposals dealing with regional cohesion. The data also show that the policy importance of the amendments is the main predictor of the Commission's willingness to accept the advice of subnational governments. Furthermore, the Commission, being a non-elected and technocratic body, is more likely to hear the policy preferences of local and regional stakeholders when the public expresses dissatisfaction with EU democracy.

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