Author (Corporate) | European Parliament: European Parliamentary Research Service |
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Publisher | EU |
Series Title | In-Depth Analysis |
Series Details | November 2016 |
Publication Date | November 2016 |
Content Type | Report |
Please note: Each In-Depth Analysis is assigned a DOI (digital object identifier), which is a safe and long term way of ensuring a hyperlink to the full text of this report. However, when ESO creates this record, on occasion the DOI still has not been activated by the EU Bookshop. If you find the source url hyperlink does not work please use the alternative location hyperlink listed as a related url.Vol.1 by Dirk Schoenmaker The author categorises the largest euro-area banking groups according to their number of entities, cross-border assets and governance. We identify three main impediments to resolvability: complex structures, the broad definition of critical functions and provision of liquidity after resolution. We make recommendations to address these impediments. This paper was requested by the European Parliament under the supervision of its Economic Governance Support Unit. Vol.2 by Rosa M Lastra (et al) Based upon such data and taxonomy, the paper poses a number of questions or issues that the Single Resolution Board might consider in their resolvability assessments in the light of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the SRM regulation. The paper outlines avenues for further research since greater clarity is needed to understand both legal and operational structures of banking groups in the euro area. This paper was requested by the European Parliament under the supervision of its Economic Governance Support Unit. Vol.3 by Willem Pieter de Groen To carry out this analysis, the author assessed the 125 banks that were under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank as of May 2016, of which almost three-quarters are internationally active and more than a third of which are owned or controlled by one or more other banks. This paper looks at the critical elements in the resolvability of these internationally active and bank-owned banking groups and reaches two main findings. First, resolution authorities need to introduce closer coordination and cooperation in order to lower the costs of resolution (e.g. bail-in costs and negative financial stability effects). Secondly, decision-makers within bank-owned banking groups need to change their system of governance to allow for orderly resolution (e.g. to allow prompt capital and asset transfers for loss absorption in resolution). This paper was requested by the European Parliament under the supervision of its Economic Governance Support Unit. |
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Source Link | Link to Main Source http://dx.publications.europa.eu/10.2861/622642 |
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Subject Categories | Business and Industry |
Countries / Regions | Europe |