Author (Person) | Kononczuk, Wojciech |
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Publisher | Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) |
Series Title | OSW Commentary |
Series Details | No.192 (03.12.15) |
Publication Date | 03/12/2015 |
Content Type | Journal | Series | Blog |
Abstract: The post-Maidan Ukrainian government found itself forced to launch a comprehensive state reform process due to both the deep crisis in all the key areas of the state’s operation and the enormous demand for change among the Ukrainian public. The promise to carry out structural reforms based on the European model became a key point in Kyiv’s political rhetoric. However, one year after the formation of the second cabinet led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2 December 2014) and one and a half years since the inauguration of Petro Poroshenko as president (7 June 2014), it was clear that the reform process in Ukraine was moving at a snail’s pace and was far from fulfilling its post-Maidan declarations. It also provoked increasing frustration among the public due to the lack of expected effects. Delays in the reform process were growing. This was due to a number of factors, the most important of which were: strong resistance from the circles whose interests were at stake; rivalry between the various political players for maintaining control over a given area of operation of the state; conflicting interests and disputes between the four parties which formed the government coalition; the influence of oligarchs linked to individual groups in the government; and the Ukrainian bureaucracy’s inefficiency and corruption. In some areas there was a lack of political will visible in the government. This was because the political elite was changed only to a limited extent after Maidan. Last but not least, the reforms were slowed down because a large part of the state administration had to make efforts to defend the country as a consequence of Russian aggression. |
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Source Link | Link to Main Source http://aei.pitt.edu/71464/ |
Countries / Regions | Ukraine |