The Bargaining Power of Territorially Constituted Institutionalised Coalitions in EU Council Negotiations

Abstract:
There is growing evidence that negotiations in the European Union Council are not only taking place within the formal EU decision making structures. Member states strive to identify like-minded peers and to exchange information prior to the formal negotiations. Institutionalised intergovernmental coalitions that exist among the member states on a geographical affinity basis, e.g. Benelux and Nordic subgroups facilitate exchange among their members and grant them a bargaining advantage. The knowledge of the effects of territorially constituted institutionalised coalitions is, however, limited.

Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, this study argues that territorially constituted institutionalised coalitions enhance the bargaining power through three mechanisms: first, exchange of information, which counterbalances the asymmetries in information distribution at the pre-negotiation stage; second, pooling of expertise that allows the member states to share resources and provide common argumentation for their positions; and, third, through rhetorical action that gives more strength to normative justifications ,which may lead to the normative entrapment of other member states outside the coalition.