‘Teaming up’ to lead an enlarged Union

Date: 05/06/03

The current EU rotation system will be too unwieldy after ten new member states join next year. Antonio Missiroli examines two possible alternatives

NO MATTER what compromise is reached in the European Convention on the controversial proposal of an EU President, underlying problems remain.

How does the Union combine the need for continuity and effectiveness in its action with the demand for equality and rotation among its members - especially given the forthcoming enlargement?

The current rotation system needs changes, especially in the light of forthcoming enlargements.

The system is ill-suited for executive councils and functions. The most important case in point is the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). It is not by accident that broad consensus has been achieved on the figure of a 'double-hatted' EU Foreign Minister, combining the functions of Javier Solana (the high representative for foreign affairs) and Chris Patten (the external relations commissioner) and presiding over a revamped Foreign Affairs Council.

The Union's foreign policy definitely needs a single voice and a single face as much as a single line of authority and accountability. The present set-up is a source of confusion, waste and infighting. Consequently, the rotational presidency and the troika should be abolished.

This does not mean that the principles of rotation and equality among member states should be abolished too. In a Union of 25-plus, however, they will need to be applied in a more effective fashion.

One way would be to try and limit the decreasing homogeneity and the increasing imbalance of resources and experience among the member states.

A possible solution envisages 'teaming up' the EU countries in six groups. Each group would include one large country, one founding member of the EC, at least one of the partners who joined the EC/EU between 1973 and 1995, at least one of the accession states and, roughly, one Mediterranean, one central European, and one Nordic/Baltic country.

As a result, potential 'natural' allies (in terms of language and/or geography) would be placed in different groups, and a measure of regional and cultural diversity would be preserved within each group.

Moreover, the six would roughly equal each other in terms of 'weighted' votes inside the Council (as laid down in the Nice Treaty), overall population, and/or the combination thereof.

Notable exceptions are Germany on the one hand, Spain and Poland on the other. It is evident that the ratio between population and 'weighted' votes is most distorted here in that, taken together, Spain and Poland hardly match Germany's population but hold almost twice as much voting power in the Council.

This is one result of the system of 'regressive proportionality' approved at Nice.

This case apart, the overall design outlined below has a certain consistency: in future, candidates for accession could be placed in the blank spots, so the relative balance and the 'six-pack' structure would be preserved with only marginal adjustments.

The idea is to organize rotation and representation around the six groups, rather than individual countries. Rotation would occur both at the macro (EU) and the micro (group) level. Group members would be forced to cooperate along rules common to all six teams. Depending on the length of tenure (preferably one year rather than the current six months), each group would have the chance to be in charge of the coordination of given policies relatively often, more frequently than every 12-15 years as is the case today.

The smaller countries could balance the large one within each group, but the latter would preserve a potential leadership role. Also, a preliminary synthesis of the different regional interests will have to be found within each group, thus facilitating the same process at EU level and preventing the formation of sub-regional lobbies and various 'clubs'.

Finally, senior partners could help the junior ones learn about EU policymaking.

The 'six-pack' system would be applied, first and foremost, to Council presidencies whenever they act in a legislative mode. Their overall number could well be reduced to fit the six-pack rule of thumb. If group A, for instance, presides over a given Council, the relevant programme would be drafted collectively and, if a meeting is chaired by a British representative, for example, it could be held in Hungary or Latvia - or vice-versa. Secondly, it could find useful applications within the CFSP: regardless of who is appointed Foreign Minister, there would always be special representatives and envoys appointed from all groups.

Finally, the same system of representation could be applied to the Commission. With enlargement to 25 and more, it is unthinkable that the College can work effectively with one commissioner per country. So why not reduce the number of portfolios to a maximum of 12 and rotate commissioners both among groups and within group members?

For instance, each group could have two posts in the five-year Commission. Over a period of ten-15 years, each EU member will have been entitled to one, while some flexibility could be used for the duration of tenures.

This would be a fair and efficient way of solving the dilemma between continuity /effectiveness and equality/democracy. It would render transparent what is already being done much less openly.

It could set new incentives for integration and communication. It could also close the gaps within the Union. Most importantly, at any given time, virtually every EU member would be in charge of some policy coordination. This would enhance the shareholder value of membership and keep alive the different national public's attention.

It would also streamline and strengthen the Union's machinery without scrapping the principles that represent a constitutive part of the European project.

A second possible adjustment of the rotational system stems from a completely different approach - one that combines size and common sub-regional interests.

It has a precedent in the history of the EU, when the six founding members began a practice whereby the Benelux countries, taken together, would equal each 'bigger' partner in terms of voting power and representation while establishing a rotational principle among themselves. One can find a trace of that in the Nice Treaty too, whereby the combined 'weighted' votes of the Benelux trio still equal those of the four largest states (29 votes matching, individually, Germany, the UK, France and Italy).

The enlarged EU could be organized in ten blocs. Needless to say, the outcome in terms of combined weighted votes and population is less neat than in the six-pack solution, and some adjustments are always conceivable.

Yet it is also possible that the Nice method for calculating qualified majority voting may be dropped, thus making 'weighted' votes less relevant.

Moreover, this solution would have advantages, in terms of simplicity and geographical representation.

Future members could fit even more easily into the scheme: for instance, Norway in the Nordic 'bloc', Bulgaria, Romania and perhaps Croatia, Albania and Macedonia in the Balkan or central one.

This solution could be applied to both legislative Council presidencies and other EU posts. It is even more adaptable when applied to the European Commission, given that each 'bloc' would always have at least one commissioner.

The plan's main asset is its ability to directly reflect the different interests that will coexist in an enlarged EU. Granted, this is also its main liability: it tends to emphasize such interests and preserve the occasional advocacy role of the presidency.

Yet it is easier to apply than the six-pack plan, and more viable politically.

The unwieldy alternative is a system in which every member state has a commissioner, and all legislative presidencies rotate in alphabetical order among the 25-plus every six months or so.

• Dr Antonio Missiroli is a research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris.

Analysis of two possible alternatives to the EU's rotating presidency of the Council.