Sweden moves towards central role in European policy-making

Date: 11/07/1996

SWEDEN'S approach to the EU is undergoing a sea change - but this has gone virtually unnoticed, even in the country itself.

After scores of teething troubles when the biggest brother in the Nordic family first entered the Union 18 months ago, Sweden is now steadily beginning to develop a European policy - even though the vast majority of its citizens are Eurosceptics.

The change in the Swedish attitude to the daily business of the EU and discussions on the future shape of the Union in the Intergovernmental Conference can be explained by two main factors: experience and a single change in Sweden's political situation.

That change came with the election three months ago of HSB - Han Som Bestämmer - The One Who Decides.

HSB is the nickname of the new Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, who took over from Ingvar Carlsson as leader of the Swedish Social Democrats at an extraordinary party conference in the spring.

Although he had almost no previous experience of politics at national level, except for a relatively short spell as finance minister under Carlsson, Persson has been hailed as the answer to almost all the problems that have plagued Sweden since the late Eighties.

Before becoming finance minister, Persson was a local politician in the small town of Katrineholm. But what he lacks in political experience is, in the public's eyes, more than compensated for by his ability to take decisive action.

Within a few short months, he has become the person in Sweden who can take decisions. And, more important still, he is not afraid of doing so.

For the generations of Swedes who grew up in the post-war years believing they lived in the perfect welfare society, the past few years have come as a shock.

With unemployment rising almost overnight from 0 to nearly 15&percent;, interest rates reaching 500&percent; at one stage and cuts in welfare benefits such as allowances for the unemployed and sick - combined with recent extraordinary hot summers and a good football team - the Swedes became fond of joking that their country now possessed all the characteristics of a banana republic.

Faced with these enormous changes in society, a large majority of Swedes had only one message for any political leader seeking to win their support: bring us back the good old Sixties.

Several Swedish politicians promised to do just that, even though they knew it would be impossible to deliver.

When Stockholm announced in 1991 that it intended to apply for membership of the Union, it unintentionally demonstrated that it was merely doing so for the economic benefits offered by the European club. The announcement was made as part of an overall crisis package, of which EU membership was one of four new initiatives.

And it has been the economic benefits of joining and the costs of staying outside which have, until now, dominated the Swedish debate about the Union and are still the key issues for most ordinary Swedes.

But for the political élite, the nature of the debate is changing.

When Swedish politicians make speeches in public about the Intergovernmental Conference and the need to change the treaty, they still devote the vast majority of their words to the need to strengthen the role of employment, the environment, consumer protection and equality between the sexes in the revised Union treaty.

And when questioned as to whether changes in these areas will be adequate to allow the EU to operate efficiently when it expands to take in up to 12 more members, most Swedish politicians duck the question.

But with at least a year to go before the end of the IGC negotiations, the government has slowly begun to float ideas about those political areas of Union cooperation which traditionally have not gone down well with Swedish voters.

Most visible is the joint Swedish-Finnish proposal to give the EU a defence identity. The influence of Swedish Commissioner Anita Gradin has also convinced the government that working methods in the area of justice and home affairs need to be drastically revised to improve efficiency.

The trickiest EU-related question in domestic Swedish politics, however, remains that of economic and monetary union.

But economic statistics which show that Sweden stands little chance of being among the first wave of countries to qualify for the last phase of EMU on 1 January 1999 could be a blessing in disguise for the government, delaying the moment of decision.

Persson is under constant pressure from party backbenchers and powerful trade unions to give the voters the final say on an eventual Swedish entry into EMU.

Until now, he has resisted such pressure, insisting that the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) has the right to decide. But even inside the parliament, opposition to the single currency is growing, fuelled by a new tide of right-wingers in the main conservative party, Moderaterna, whose opposition to EMU is becoming increasingly vocal.

Even respectable right-wing and centre newspapers have come out against membership of the single currency zone.

But HSB has made his decision. Parliament shall decide when the time comes.

Persson also made it clear from day one that he was determined to take a strong personal hold on the country's European policy. At the extraordinary congress where he was elected party chairman, the Eurosceptics planned to revolt against the official party line, but they never got the chance.

Persson immediately silenced anyone who tried to deviate from the party line by simply telling people to 'straighten up'.

His next move was to sack his minister for European affairs, Mats Hellström. Part of Hellström's portfolio was given to Björn von Sydow the new foreign trade minister, while the rest was taken up by Gunnar Lund, the Swedish secretary of state in the foreign office who represents Sweden in the IGC negotiations.

Persson himself also took a slice of the cake, demanding that all controversial Union matters should be dealt with by him personally and not, as previously, by the foreign office.

Persson's next move was to begin the search for political allies among the heads of state and governments in other European capitals.

While he did nothing at last month's Florence summit to hide the fact that he was not at ease with the way meetings dealt with EU affairs - telling journalists in very frank terms that summiteers spent far too much time on symbolic acts such as the signing of EU agreements with Chile and Uzbekistan - Persson worked hard behind the scenes to forge closer ties with fellow prime ministers.

For Persson is well aware that good relations are the key to influence, both in his own small Katrineholm and at the highest political level in Europe.

While Persson is the key figure behind the changes in Sweden's attitude towards Europe, the country's civil servants in Stockholm and Brussels responsible for dealing with the Union on a day-to-day business are also getting to grips with the way the EU works, after some early hiccups.

Stockholm's initial ignorance of the realpolitik of operating in Brussels was demonstrated by its insistence that Sweden's ambassador to the EU, Frank Belfrage, should give greater priority to welcoming visiting ministers from home than to attending Coreper meetings.

In the early days, Sweden also left empty chairs in several working groups, irritating other member state officials by failing to turn up and then reopening issues which others thought had already been settled at ambassadorial meetings.

But today such mistakes are a rarity - a sign not only that Sweden has learnt to play the 'Brussels' game, but also that, while it is never going to be among those nations leading the argument for greater political integration, Stockholm is now making an effort to place itself at the centre of European policy-making.