Super-commissioner no cure for Lisbon ills

By Dana Spinant

Date: 26/02/04

THE call by leaders of France, Germany and the UK for a super-commissioner in charge of economic policy was justified, at last week's Berlin summit, by the need to rejuvenate the European Union's reform drive.

Urging the member states to speed up the adjustment of their economic structures and welfare systems, the three said a Commission vice-president was needed to boost restructuring across the Union. Under their plan, this vice-president would push ahead with the Lisbon Agenda reforms programme - aimed at making the EU the most competitive knowledge-driven economy by 2010 - and would organize the work of commissioners whose portfolios are "particularly important for its realization".

"The vice president should have a voice in all decisions on EU projects which impact on targets of the Lisbon Agenda," Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair wrote in the letter to the Irish EU presidency.

However, a super-commissioner is unlikely to be the solution for Europe's reform delays. In order for such a person to have an impact upon economic restructuring, a number of conditions must be met.

Firstly, the holder of this post - and thus the Commission - should be given more powers over the coordination of economic policies.

The super-commissioner should chair the Ecofin Council (that gathers EU economics and finance ministers) and look after agreements being reached on the Commission's proposals.

But member states - in particular the UK - have been reluctant, during negotiations in the Convention on the future of the EU on a draft European constitution - to give the Commission more clout over this.

The draft's timid proposals have been further watered down in negotiations over a final version of the constitution in the intergovernmental conference (IGC), with the result that economic policy will remain largely in member states' hands.

Secondly, in order for such a super-commissioner to bring about results, member states must be committed to reaching speedier agreements on the Commission's proposals and duly implement legislation they adopted under their Lisbon commitments.

The reasons behind the plan to create such a post are pertinent: with a College to comprise 25 members from November - and 27 from 2007 - the Lisbon agenda tasks are likely to be split between as many as five or six commissioners.

This fragmentation could have an influence on the coherence of the Commission's proposals.

The debates in the IGC have practically ruled out any chance of reducing the size of the Commission - to 15 members and 15 deputies, as proposed by the Convention - because the majority of small member states insist on keeping their commissioner.

From this perspective, it would make sense to have a senior commissioner who has a broad overview of the whole of the Lisbon agenda, from employment strategy to research and development or information society issues.

However, a post of super-commissioner would raise sensitive questions: what relationship would the holder of this post have with the president and with the commissioners working under his or her command? Would this post create a hierarchy within the College?

One Commission spokesman warned that the choice of who is to be the next president will be more difficult, if the person to replace Romano Prodi has to work with such a powerful number two.

"If we have a super-commissioner for economics, what megaperson do we need for the Commission presidency?" he said. "How would the two work together? Would the president still have any authority over economics? Or would such powers be completely outsourced to his vice-president?"

Equally, it is unclear whether the super-commissioner would merely coordinate the work of his colleagues on Lisbon Agenda dossiers or whether, crucially, he would be able to overrule them.

If the plan is to have a boss-commissioner - as opposed to a primus inter pares (first among equals), the Commission should have more than one such powerful vice-president.

Under this scenario, the College would be organized in clusters of commissioners led by four or five vice-presidents (for economic policy and external relations, for instance), which together with the president would form the inner decision-making group.

The Prodi team has put forward such a clusters-scheme proposal to organize a larger Commission of 25 members.

This plan would ensure coherence while avoiding the boss-commissioner for economics being seen as an isolated rival to the president.

However, a super-commissioner would not necessarily be a panacea for reinvigorating the EU's reforms - he or she would only be able to deliver super-reforms if given the powers to do so.

Ironically, the UK rejected - during debates in the Convention - a suggestion from French commissioner Michel Barnier that a super-commissioner for economic policy should be created. Peter Hain, Britain's government representative on the forum, ruled out an economic minister for Europe and opposed any extra powers being given to the Commission.

The significant U-turn in the UK's position could be explained in one of two ways: either Tony Blair changed his mind over the necessity of having Brussels involved in economic policy coordination, or the British premier does not actually intend that this super-commissioner should have real powers.

How serious the UK, France and Germany are about this matter will only become clear when the economic policy chapter is renegotiated in the IGC. If member states decide to keep their powers over this, the appointment of a super-commissioner will be merely window-dressing.

In addition, the main problem with Europe's economy does not lie with the Commission and its capacity to formulate reform proposals, but with member states and their ability to implement reforms.

Even if they are vetted by a super-commissioner, the Commission's Lisbon Agenda proposals are still likely to be met with the same wide splits in the Council of Ministers - and member states would have the same difficulties in reaching the qualified majority or unanimity required for decisions to be taken.

A super-commissioner would be good for Europe's reforms, but it is not the overall solution - because the Commission is not the problem.

Commentary feature in which author says that the call by France, Germany and the UK for a 'super-commissioner' in charge of economic policy within the European Commission is not likely to achieve anything as essentially Member States are not prepared for more effective European economic policy co-ordination.

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