Summit shenanigans

European leaders should be debating the Union's future, not squabbling over money

THE timing of European Union summits is often awkward. This week's began after The Economist went to press and will be over by the time we reach many readers. Yet even before EU leaders had gathered in Brussels, it was clear that they had made mistakes in the run-up to the meeting.

The biggest was not to pay more respectful attention to the French and Dutch voters who, only a few weeks ago, resoundingly rejected the EU constitution. Instead, the summit was poised to lapse into yet another row about the EU budget. Britain's Tony Blair and France's Jacques Chirac spent much of the week before the summit trading blows, after Mr Chirac demanded that Britain make a “gesture of solidarity” by giving up part or all of its EU budget rebate, first granted in 1984. Mr Blair countered not only that Britain paid a lot more than France, but also that Mr Chirac should accept deeper reform of the common agricultural policy, first set up in 1962. This budget row will seem arcane to many. Since both men have a veto, it can be settled only if both are willing to move: Mr Chirac must put the CAP and its financing on the table and, in exchange, Mr Blair must be willing to forgo part or all of the rebate. Because neither seemed ready to give ground this week, a deal was always unlikely.

That makes it especially unfortunate that the current Luxembourg presidency of the EU chose to press so hard for one. The argument of Luxembourg's prime minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, was that it was vital to strike a deal on the budget, to demonstrate that, despite the shock of the no votes in France and the Netherlands, the EU could continue to function normally. Yet there is no real urgency about settling the budget; and it is arrogant of EU leaders to pretend to carry on as usual in the face of such a huge popular rejection of all they have been doing. Instead, they should have used this summit to kick off a period of serious reflection and debate about what their Union is for and where it ought to be going.

The worst way to start such a debate is to squabble over money. Instead, Europe's leaders should have quickly recognised that, after the conclusive Franco-Dutch rejections, the constitution in its present form is dead. It seems that one or two countries (including Mr Juncker's own Luxembourg) may still choose to put it to the vote, but most surely will not. It would thus be best to put the constitution into cold storage for at least a few years - and possibly forever - while a proper debate about the Union's future takes place.

Next, however, EU leaders must do their utmost to ensure that failure of the constitution does not wreak undesirable collateral damage. That means, above all, not letting it stop plans for future expansion of the club, even if it may mean some delay. The entry of Romania and Bulgaria ought to proceed as planned, preferably in 2008 or 2009. The EU should also make clear to the countries of the western Balkans that the door to membership remains open. There are two answers to those who argue that rejection of the constitution signified also rejection of further enlargement. One is that most voters were surely thinking of Turkey, not the Balkans. The second is that the Balkan countries will be more costly and disruptive to the EU if they are kept out than if, one day, they are let in.

Turkey itself is far more problematic. Many French and Dutch voters cited the country's prospective entry as a reason for saying no to the EU constitution. But EU leaders should, even so, keep to the timetable they promised last December of starting entry talks with Turkey on October 3rd. The risks, to both the EU and Turkey, of saying no are unacceptably high. And because negotiations with Turkey will last at least ten years, European leaders can legitimately reassure voters that there is no guarantee - on either the EU's or Turkey's side - that entry talks will automatically lead to full membership.

Liberal and outward, or protected and inward

More fundamentally, EU leaders, especially but not only from France and the Netherlands, should now be reflecting more thoughtfully than they seem to have done so far on the message the voters were sending them by rejecting the constitution. Of course the voters were dissatisfied with their national governments, particularly over their failure to deliver stronger economic growth and more jobs, and with the perceived rapidity of enlargement if not with enlargement per se. But they were also expressing an instinctive, strong hostility to a remote, bureaucratic and intrusive Europe.

There are, in principle, two different ways of responding to this message. One, favoured by Mr Blair and most of the new EU members from central Europe, is to press forward with an economically liberal, outward-looking and expanding EU that, freed from unnecessary Brussels interference, regains its economic dynamism. The other, seemingly preferred by Mr Chirac and some older members, is to turn inwards and seek to shore up the protection that surrounds the EU's supposed social model. All experience suggests that the first approach would do more to revitalise Europe's economy and to create jobs. But what Europe needs now is a full debate about the relative merits of each response.

Editorial previewing the challenges facing the EU at the European Council, Brussels, 16-17 June 2005.