Author (Person) | Crossick, Stanley |
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Series Title | European Voice |
Series Details | Vol.11, No.44, 8.12.05 |
Publication Date | 08/12/2005 |
Content Type | News |
Date: 08/12/05 Received wisdom dictates that lasting peace can only be made by agreement between the parties and necessarily involves the building of mutual trust. This has been the view of Israeli leaders since that country's foundation. Is Ariel Sharon about to defy such received wisdom? Until the Gaza withdrawal, the Israeli prime minister's policies appeared to be based on long-term annexation of as much of Palestine as possible. The decision to withdraw from Gaza was eminently sensible, even given this policy objective, as the territory had little religious and no strategic significance and its long-term retention would have meant the absorption into Israel of well over one million Palestinians, with a much higher birth rate. The decision appeared to be predicated on the belief that it would then be easier permanently to annex a large part of the West Bank. Recent events suggest, however, that this may not be Sharon's strategy. Recognising that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is a willing negotiator for peace but cannot deliver a mutually acceptable agreement because of his weakness vis-�is extremist Palestinian factions, the Israeli prime minister appears to be adopting the only course open if he wants to achieve a two-state solution. This he clearly does as otherwise Israel will lose its character as a Jewish state, unless it adopts a long-term policy based on apartheid. Paradoxically, the controversial security fence may prove to be a key stage towards a permanent settlement. Peace between neighbours is usually best achieved by their learning to live together and not apart. But the 'land for security' is the only fair and practical basis for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians and hitherto it has not been possible to break the vicious circle. Sharon could well be contemplating unilateral action as the first step towards mapping out the final borders of Israel. The current line of the fence annexes some 10% of the West Bank and prevents a 'contiguous' Palestine, which is a precondition of any final settlement. Sharon therefore knows that adjustments will have to be made. Clearly, no settlers can be left on the Palestinian side of the fence. This means that the majority will have to give up their settlements and a minority - such as those living in Hebron - will remain in return for some land exchange. Sharon showed that with determination and careful planning it was possible to evacuate the Gaza settlements in an essentially peaceful manner. The problem of the West Bank settlers is much greater and their resistance is likely to be tougher and certainly even more emotional. But, with the majority of Israeli public opinion behind him, this further withdrawal is still achievable. This still leaves two major challenges: the right of return of Palestinians to Israel and Jerusalem. As to the former, this will have to be foregone: immensely painful for many Palestinians but realistic. Hopefully, some nominal right of return can be achieved which concedes the principle but not the practice. Jerusalem remains the final hurdle: the only hope is that a solution can be found when all other issues have been resolved and the context thereby changed. Only a few months ago, all this would have been unimaginable, but it is important not to underestimate the speed of change nor the effect of creating 'facts on the ground'. Public opinion on both sides of the fence also appears to be moving in the right direction. Although the Sharon plan is essentially unilateral, there is a place - as there was in the Gaza evacuation - for some 'co-ordinated unilateralism'. Needless to say, this overall scenario presupposes Ariel Sharon being the next Israeli prime minister and there being no fundamental destabilisation of the West Bank and Gaza after the January Palestinian elections. Ariel Sharon has never been seen as a man of peace, but nor was Menachem Begin, who negotiated land for peace with Egypt. It so often takes a nationalistic hardliner to deliver, Charles de Gaulle's withdrawal from Algeria being the most significant example of this phenomenon in post-Second World War history.
Commentary feature taking a look at the policies of Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon. |
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Countries / Regions | Europe, Middle East |