Special Issue: The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?

Abstract: The paradox of federalism is about whether self-rule accommodates or exacerbates ethnic divisions. A federal arrangement that formally recognizes ethno-linguistic diversity to help manage divisions can also pave the way for eventual disintegration. In this introductory piece, the editors of this Special Issue highlight a number of common reference points for the study of the secession-inducing and secession-preventing features of federalism: First, the political will of the secessionists and their capacity to mobilize to this end; secondly, the characteristics of federal institutional/constitutional design; and, thirdly, economic and sociological uncodified factors that have a bearing upon these questions.

Contents
Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms - Philip G. Roeder
The Political Dynamics of Secession and Institutional Accommodation - Hudson Meadwell
Federalism in a Unitary State: a Paradox too Far? - Stephen Tierney
The Partisan Logic of Decentralization in Europe - Jason Sorens
The Paradox of Ethnic Partition: Lessons from de facto Partition in Bosnia and Kosovo - Erin K. Jenne
State, Society and Separatism in Punjab - Kristin M. Bakke
The Paradox of Federalism: Some Practical Reflections - David Cameron

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