Sounds like a job for super-Commissioner

Date: 12/11/1998

Reform is the European Commission's current buzzword as it seeks to respond to criticism from EU governments and the general public, but opinion is divided over whether giving more power to fewer officials is the best way forward. Rory Watson reports

REVOLUTION or piecemeal reform? Within weeks, the willingness of the European Commission to overhaul its policy-making structures will become clearer.

As speculation mounts about who will be appointed as Commission president when Jacques Santer's term of office ends in December next year, there is also much talk about how dossiers will be shared out between members of the incoming team.

That debate is intensifying ahead of a forthcoming report by the institution's Secretary-General Carlo Trojan based on the work of 12 teams which have spent the past six months carrying out an in-depth analysis of all aspects of it's internal activities.

It already appears that earlier suggestions that the Commission could be divided into ten super-directorates-general, instead of the existing 24 smaller departments, are now distinctly unlikely to be taken up.

However, this has not prevented some officials from floating the idea of creating a small team of 'super-Commissioners' who would be allocated more substantial dossiers than their colleagues.

Supporters of the idea suggest that four such super-Commissioners could be given over-arching responsibility for key areas of EU policy: foreign policy, monetary union and the internal market, competition issues and agriculture.

As part of the ongoing power play between the Union's smaller and larger member states, it has even been suggested that this quartet of top posts could be shared out among the EU's biggest countries (although one of the five would have to be disappointed). To avoid protests from smaller countries that they were being discriminated against, the post of president would be reserved for a national from one of the remaining ten member states.

This idea draws heavily on a formula briefly discussed during the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference, at which the Amsterdam Treaty was drawn up, as negotiators considered ways of coping with the prospect of even more Commissioners being appointed once the Union expands.

Under this plan, two categories of Commissioner would be created. The first group - the size of which would be determined by the number of substantial portfolios available - would enjoy full rights, while the second would be given the rank of deputy Commissioners. The latter would be members of the institution's decision-making College, but would not be given responsibility for any specific dossiers.

The first group would meet, when appropriate, and agree proposals by a simple majority, which would then be submitted to the combined College of full and deputy Commissioners.

The advantage of this formula is that it would provide for one Commissioner per member state in an enlarged Union without creating an unwieldy bureaucratic machine.

The major disadvantage is that it would leave representatives from many countries with little to do and, more importantly, would abolish the long-established principle that all Commissioners are equal. The prospect of their nominee being put into the Commission's second division is not a scenario which many governments could stomach.

Nor are they likely to accept the idea of appointing four super-Commissioners, for the same reason. Critics also warn that this would be putting the cart before the horse, because the Commissioners' roles should correspond to the institution's new internal structure and not vice versa.

Indeed, thinking in the upper echelons of the Commission is focusing more on the role of the two existing vice-presidents, rather than on a radical shake-up of the entire team. "We are trying to examine how we can use these more effectively and strategically," explained one senior official.

It now appears more than likely that the holder of one of these posts will be given an overall foreign policy brief, and may be assigned 'flanking Commissioners' for particular geographical or sectoral areas. A strong case could be made, for example, for giving one member of the new Commission full-time responsibility for coordinating enlargement negotiations without having any other duties.

Supporters of this approach argue that a strong vice-president with overall responsibility for foreign policy would bring greater coherence to the Commission's activities, something which is lacking despite the informal meetings of the five Commissioners with responsibility for external relations dossiers which take place at the moment.

It would also ensure that the institution is not totally overshadowed by the Council of Ministers when EU leaders eventually appoint their own Common Foreign and Security Policy supremo, irreverently dubbed 'Mr or Mrs CSFP'.

Similarly, there is growing support for the idea that the other vice-president should focus on the pivotal aspects of EU domestic policy: monetary union and employment - a tandem which will dominate the agenda in the years ahead.

Despite the understandable reluctance within the Commission to contemplate a complete overhaul in the institution's internal structure, producing what the staff working group under the former Secretary-General David Williamson this month described as "an administrative earthquake", there will undoubtedly be some departmental changes.

"To what extent do the Commissioners' current portfolios really reflect industrial reality?" asked one senior Commission official. "Being responsible for industry, but not for research and development does not make sense." On the other hand, he acknowledged, creating a departmental powerhouse along the lines of Japan's legendary ministry of international trade and industry (MITI) would certainly arouse suspicions in national capitals.

Some officials still believe there is scope for bringing together all the Commission's communications, audio-visual and information units, and others go even further by suggesting that a Commissioner could be appointed as the institution's official spokesperson instead of leaving the job to a civil servant.

As the Commission's role changes and it becomes more of a manager and rule-enforcer and less of a legislative architect, so the demands on the Commissioners and their staff will change.

While the debate continues over how best to respond to these challenges, one thing is certain: the president of the new Commission team which will take office in January 2000 will have unprecedented authority over his or her colleagues.

The statement in the Amsterdam Treaty that "the Commission shall work under the political guidance of its president" may appear anodyne, but it is, in fact, highly significant.

It means that the president will, in future, have the final say in how portfolios are allocated and even the right to 'reshuffle' the team in mid-term by redistributing dossiers, a flexibility which many past presidents would have relished.

The new president will also have a far greater influence over the appointment of future Commissioners. While it will still be up to national governments to nominate their chosen candidates, the president will, at least in theory, be able to reject them instead of having no option but to meekly accept them, as in the past.

How ready Santer's successor will be to wield this weapon remains to be seen, given that doing so would spark a political storm in national capitals.

But the very fact that he or she will have the right to say 'no', and to redistribute dossiers during the Commission's five-year term of office, is bound to prey on the minds of prospective members of the new team. While the current incumbents can defy the wishes of the president with impunity, their successors will be acutely aware that they do so at their peril.

That could be the biggest factor influencing the shape and behaviour of the incoming team of Commissioners which will take office in January.

Major feature on plans to reform the European Commission.