Solana still has work to do over Russian reaction to the ‘Orange Revolution’

By David Cronin

Date: 09/12/04

THE proliferation of orange scarves in the European Parliament conveys the impression that there is a deep yearning in Brussels for Ukraine to forge closer links with the EU.

Ironically, however, top EU figures have long been wary of taking such steps. Unlike the Baltic states, Ukraine did not become part of the EU's expansion plans after it won independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, apparently because of pressure from Russia. More recently, Romano Prodi, then president of the European Commission, claimed that Ukraine "has as much reason to be in the EU as New Zealand".

Nevertheless, Javier Solana, the Union's high representative for foreign policy, has shown considerable tenacity since alleged vote-rigging in the 21 November election sparked supporters of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko to mount their Orange Revolution.

Flanked by Aleksander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus, the presidents of Poland and Lithuania, he has persuaded Yushchenko and the official winner of the disputed poll, Viktor Yanukovich, to enter into intensive negotiations.

The pressure seems to have paid dividends: violence has so far been averted and Yanukovich has grudgingly accepted that a fresh poll should be held.

But the EU's role in the crisis has been heavily criticized in Russia. The Duma - its national parliament - has accused the Union of "destructive external interference" in Ukraine.

Sergei Lavrov, Moscow's foreign minister, has argued that some EU capitals are trying to "steer the situation in Ukraine away from a legal path" through sympathizing with the street protestors in Kiev.

So does this outbreak of Cold War style rhetoric indicate Russian fears that the EU will lure Ukraine away from its sphere of influence?

Timofei Bordachev, of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, says that many in his country's political elite are nervous about the prospect of populations in other ex-Soviet states whose governments are pro-Russian - such as Belarus - emulating the Orange Revolution or the Rose Revolution in Georgia last year.

"The Russian elite is scared to be alone. They assume that once Belarus follows Ukraine, Russia will become a lonely tiger, that it wouldn't survive if it wasn't anchored in the region."

But a new paper from the London-based Centre for European Reform contends that it would be wrong to consider the EU's diplomatic initiative in Ukraine as an attempt to weaken Russia.

"Except for the Poles and Lithuanians, who have only just joined the EU, most Europeans regard the prospect of Ukrainian membership with horror," write the paper's authors Katinka Barysch and Charles Grant.

"The EU is finding it difficult enough to digest the ten countries that have just joined, and it is struggling to decide what to do about Turkey's bid for membership. Many European governments would very happily leave Ukraine in Russia's orbit, rather than worry about the integration of a large and backward country.

"The fact is that any Ukrainian president will have to seek good relations with both the West and Russia. The EU is Ukraine's most important trading partner, Russia is its key energy supplier and both are crucial for the country's security.

"Ukraine's East-West balancing act will probably be more difficult after the elections but just as essential to its survival as a unitary state."

According to Bordachev, Solana's recent efforts on Ukraine have marked "the first great success of European foreign policy".

But he believes that the strains with Russia will cause lasting damage to Brussels-Moscow ties. The challenge, he adds, will be for the Union to maintain the coherence it has demonstrated in the past few weeks and to avoid a split between France, Germany and Italy - the member states on friendliest terms with the Russian President Vladimir Putin - and member states more critical of Russia.

"The present shape of relations between Russia and the EU is so poor that it will be difficult to heal this situation - even for an experienced diplomat like Solana," he says.

Nina Bachktatov, editor of Inside Russia, believes that Solana showed leadership by reacting quickly to the crisis in Ukraine. But she says that his neutrality as an EU representative may have been compromised by the way he was so closely identified with the leaders of Poland and Lithuania.

"This gives the impression that Solana was influenced by countries antagonistic to Russia. The [negotiating] table was terribly unbalanced," she explains.

"Relations with Russia are already a sensitive issue between old and new [EU] members. At the same time, there is a growing realization that the West and Russia have the same interests in keeping Ukraine united and stable."

Article reports on heavy criticism in Russia of the EU's initiative to mediate in Ukraine's conflict after the fraudulent Presidential election of 21 November 2004.

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