Slow dances around European defence

Defence is once again creeping up the EU ratings, once again it does so ineffectually.

Last week UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband was ready to promote an EU charter on defence, but his boss Gordon Brown removed the word "charter" from his speech. Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has for some weeks been causing minor waves by suggesting the idea of France fully reintegrating into NATO as against a stronger EU defence capability. And while both phenomena can be put down to national politics or differing international agendas, they are near identical - and linked at source.

Many people who assume senior office having previously taken no interest in defence (especially not as related to the EU), perhaps even having disparaged the idea, often produce a surprisingly pro-Union defence line once they have their name up on the door. This is what has happened to both Miliband and Sarkozy and it is largely to do with being forced to face the facts rather than the theory.

The first fact is stark. No European nation, whether inside or outside of the EU, can deal with defence alone. The task is too large and too diffuse. By default defence is moving out of the sole realm of the nation state to a collective body, especially given fact number two - all EU member states have low defence budgets, meaning that even if they were serious about going it alone on defence they simply would not have the physical means to do so.

Fact number three relates to the UK and France, which are the two exceptions in terms of defence spending - though only in relative terms. Both have more capabilities than any other state in the EU, and definitely far more experience in combat; but both still have relatively small military machines and are over-stretched, particularly the UK. Given its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, alongside its standing force in Ireland and its presence in the Balkans, the UK probably would not be able to field any significant force in the short term. France is in only a marginally better position, but with its troops deployed in over 20 locations around the world its advantage can only be on points.

The fourth and final fact should be that all these issues can and should be dealt with by NATO, which is a longstanding military alliance with a wide membership. The problem is that the membership includes the US, which has different foreign policy aims from those of many EU member states, including France. In addition, NATO is itself at breaking point over its failing mission in Afghanistan, which is exposing both its political and military shortcomings. It is therefore unable to offer much inspiration to refreshingly young leaders in search of solutions. Therefore, European states need to consider far more pragmatically how they organise their collective defence.

Governments traditionally hide their military inadequacies - not least from their own populations, whom they are bound to protect. Nor are they keen to let both friends and neighbours know that their capabilities are low, for fear of inviting anything from derision to an attack. This means that the all-pervading defence shortcomings among EU nations are not widely known.

This is the process that both Sarkozy and Miliband have clearly experienced - and arrived at a similar conclusion: that Europeans can and should keep NATO alive for collective transatlantic purposes, but only alongside a proper EU defence capability. Expecting the US or any other non-European state to do the work is both unfair and unrealistic.

Unfortunately, they both now have the problem of selling this startling conclusion - within their own states and then to the general European public, which is very comfortable in its ignorance of defence shortcomings. Others have tried before them, notably Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac with the 1998 St Malo treaty that gave the first impetus to EU defence. They, too, were then relatively newly elected into office - and they too were ultimately faced down. Perhaps Miliband and Sarkozy will be stronger - or luckier.

• Ilana Bet-El is an academic, author and policy adviser based in Brussels.

Defence is once again creeping up the EU ratings, once again it does so ineffectually.