Sharing the Nordic view of the world

Date: 17/07/1997

SIX hundred years ago this month, the formidable Queen Margareta formed a union of the Nordic countries which lasted formally for 125 years.

Officially, it broke up in 1523 when Gustav Vasa became king of Sweden. But, in reality, Nordic unity lasted and outlived the succeeding centuries of occupation and invasion, with Denmark and Sweden as the principal aggressors.

Norway spent three centuries (1537-1814) as a Danish vassal, then 90 years under the Swedish crown before it declared itself independent in 1905. Finland belonged to Sweden from the 13th century and was then lost to the Russians in three parts between 1721 and 1809 before gaining independence in 1917.

Nordic cooperation has also withstood the ultimate litmus test of solidarity in modern days, namely Swedish and Finnish accession to the European Union in 1995. In fact, many observers say that cooperation is closer now than ever before.

In the early days of EU membership, the new northern European recruits were eager to appear independent of each other: they did not want to be seen as creating a new Nordic bloc.

Today, they all have their Nordic coordinators, meet regularly with their Icelandic and Norwegian counterparts, and confer particularly in key areas where interests converge such as the environment, trade (in the fight against protectionism), social policy, equal rights, openness and consumer issues.

In other areas where interests differ, such as industrial policy, security issues and agriculture, they have quietly agreed to disagree.

Cynics point to the discrepancies between the Nordic countries as evidence that their historic unity is clinically dead and is kept alive only by artificial resuscitation from bureaucracies such as the Nordic Council and different talking shops which cost the taxpayers of the five member countries some 93 million ecu a year.

The Swedes have become the black sheep of Nordic cooperation because of calls from Stockholm for further cuts in the already slimmed-down Nordic bureaucracy.

Marianne Jelved, the Danish minister responsible for Nordic relations, points to what she claims is Swedish inconsistency in the latest issue of the Nordic Council publication Politik i Norden. She argues that the cuts counteract Stockholm's promotion of Baltic cooperation, which relies heavily on Nordic assistance, and points out that when Denmark faced the same need to cut back expenditure in the Eighties, it never sacrificed Nordic cooperation.

When it comes to participation in Europe, it is mainly the Finns' loyalty to the group which is questioned. Finland does not risk its political EU base by fighting for purely Nordic issues.

The Finns showed only vague understanding of Swedish criticism of nickel in the new euro coins in the beginning and have demonstrated strong sympathy for French industrial interests.

Critics also point to their failure to support the Norwegians during the anti-dumping negotiations on the salmon issue, while the Swedes and Danes rallied to the Norwegian cause - albeit perhaps more out of dislike of the anti-dumping measures than out of Nordic solidarity.

But the most crucial division is perhaps over economic and monetary union, with the Danish opt-out and the Swedish wait-and-see policy contrasting with Finnish enthusiasm for joining in the first wave.

On foreign and security policy, the Nordic countries have again chosen to disagree quietly. These issues have therefore not been discussed in the Nordic fora until recently.

With three NATO members (Iceland, Norway and Denmark), Copenhagen enjoying observer status in the Western European Union (WEU), and Sweden and Finland non-allied, they have nevertheless found common ground in coordinated peacekeeping missions.

The Finns and Swedes joined forces at the Intergovernmental Conference over proposals spelling out how the WEU should be used for peacekeeping duties at the demand of the Union.

The final outcome in the revised Union treaty is very close to the original Nordic proposal, although this did not initially win the backing of the Danes, who prefer to keep all military arrangements outside the EU.

The trio even competed during the IGC negotiations in some areas, with each submitting separate proposals aimed at proving that they were the most 'green', the most open, the most equal-rights minded.

Even so, says Göran Berg, Swedish ambassador to Belgium and special envoy to NATO, “outsiders are often amazed by the closeness of the Nordic countries. Their cooperation is by far the most intense and far reaching in Europe.”

He cites the obvious example of the Schengen Convention, in which the three Nordic EU participants forced other members of the group to accept a special accord with outsiders Iceland and Norway in order to preserve the free travel area in the Nordic zone.

“It was only the persistent nagging of Denmark, Finland and Sweden which created this opportunity, which is contrary to all former EU agreements,” says Berg.

The basis for the cooperation are the roots of a common language. Politik i Norden mixes articles in the Scandinavian languages - Swedish, Danish and Norwegian - with a summary in the archaic Nordic language, Icelandic. It also exists in Finnish.

But more profoundly, the Nordic countries share a common view of an ideal world as an egalitarian society based on individual rights rather than collective duties.

Their cultural roots are also the same. Berg describes the bafflement of organisers of the Tournai textile triennial, which opened a couple of weeks ago, when artists declared their wish to create something common on different themes rather than demanding separate national pavilions.

This reflects the countries' shared culture, which has its basis in the Reformation of the 16th century.

This common culture has probably taught the Nordic countries, which are usually not in the forefront of European integration, not to be afraid of a strengthened European cultural policy. All three expressed great dissatisfaction in the aftermath of last month's Amsterdam summit that cultural matters would not be subject to qualified majority voting in the new treaty.

Protestant heritage or not, Nordic cooperation differs from that in the European Union, in that solutions have not been imposed from above but have instead emerged from grass-roots needs.

This is why the Nordic idea still has great appeal for citizens, according to Leif Blomqvist, the Finnish ambassador to Belgium and NATO. “Since World War II, the Nordic countries have approximated their legislations. It has been done with respect for the countries' differences and with no demands for absolute likeness,” he says.

This has been possible, according to Blomqvist, because Nordic cooperation is based on mutual trust between equally powerful countries which do not have to be locked by common rules, or controlled by a separate body.

Berg goes even further, arguing that the fact that “big brother Sweden” has lost political and economic influence probably only strengthens Nordic cooperation.

In the European Parliament, the Nordic members form their own informal group, with coffee mornings once a month during the Strasbourg plenary session. But while the Socialists and Liberals are keen to attend, centre-right members of the European People's Party (EPP) are more reluctant to stray outside the party's political boundaries and ally themselves geographically (and culturally).

This was underlined during the election of the EU Ombudsman. While Socialist Finnish candidate Jacob Söderman won the support of the Nordic Liberals, Nordic members of the EPP voted for the centre-right group's candidate.

There is one very obvious area, though, where Nordic cooperation has become tarnished since Finland and Sweden left the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

The Nordic fine-tuning which used to involve frequent consultations and common position papers is impossible now that Sweden, Finland and Denmark have to follow the Union lead.

But the effect of that is felt more in the United Nations in New York than in the EU in Brussels.