Russia’s armed forces. Heads roll at long last

Sackings may signal a long-overdue change in Russia's army

HE CONDUCTED political battles the way he fought wars: doggedly and against all comers. Anatoly Kvashnin, the Russian armed forces' chief of staff who was fired this week, had spent most of his seven years in the job in conflict with people meant to be his bosses. With the previous defence minister, Igor Sergeyev, he had clashed over the role of the strategic missile forces, commanded by one of his rivals. He was locked in constant power struggles with the current minister, Sergei Ivanov. And he had blocked President Vladimir Putin's attempts to start the transition from a conscript army to a leaner, professional one. But his civilian opponents outmanoeuvred him a few weeks ago, when the Duma passed a law handing operational control of the army to the defence ministry and leaving the generals in charge only of strategy. After that rout, rumours of General Kvashnin's dismissal began; and in the end, he asked to go.

The sighs of relief are almost audible, and not just in the Russian government. It was General Kvashnin who in 1999, at the end of the Kosovo war, ordered Russian troops to seize the Pristina airport, provoking a stand-off that has soured relations with NATO ever since. As a military strategist, he viewed the world and its threats as if the cold war had barely ended. He failed to plan for new sorts of war - of the high-tech or guerrilla varieties - and instead ran impressive exercises designed to repulse massive invasions from east and west.

It was during just such an exercise last month, in Russia's remote Far East, that a band of rebels sneaked past the heavy troop presence in Chechnya to attack several targets in neighbouring Ingushetia. They left 88 people dead before disappearing unharmed into the night. Mr Putin seems to have used that fiasco as an excuse to get rid not just of General Kvashnin - who commanded an early, failed invasion of Chechnya a decade ago - but of three other generals responsible for the Caucasus region, including the deputy head of the FSB, the security agency.

This could be a sign that things are at last changing. With control of the army's operations in civilian hands and a new Caucasus command, reforms delayed up to now may go ahead. General Kvashnin's replacement, Yuri Baluyevsky, is seen as the opposite of his mercurial, stubborn ex-boss: more of a desk man, a strategist and military historian, who watches his words, stays out of politics and is pragmatic about co-operating with former foes. He has led disarmament talks and parleyed with NATO. He is also a joint author of reform plans, which would slim the ministry and the military command.

But what next? An enlightened approach would be to use the change of command as an opportunity to clean up the corruption in the armed forces - particularly in Chechnya, where they do a nice sideline in trafficking weapons and oil - as well as restarting the plan for creating a volunteer army. If, however, Mr Putin's plan is merely to strengthen his control over the armed forces and improve co-ordination between the various contingents in the Caucasus, it may prevent a repeat of last month's raid. But it will not turn Russia's army into a professional force capable of meeting its military needs, rather than a meat-grinder for its young men.

The sacking of the Russian armed forces' chief of staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, and three other generals, July 2004, may signal a long-overdue change in Russia's army.

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