Rome tries to pick up the pace of IGC negotiations

Date: 23/05/1996

EU diplomats have made more progress on revising the Maastrict Treaty than might appear at first sight. Rory Watson reports.

CASUAL observers may be tempted to think that the ultimate destination of an updated Maastricht Treaty is as far away now as it was last December at the EU summit in Madrid.

Intergovernmental Conference negotiators have been locked together in semi-permanent conclave for the past seven weeks, but have made little visible progress from the position staked out by former Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp's Reflection Group last year.

“No one has shown their hand yet. All they have been doing is shuffling the cards and these have not yet been dealt,” concluded one senior diplomat as the IGC group this week embarked on its second lap of the Maastricht course.

But behind the curtain dividing negotiators from the outside world, issues are coming into sharper focus and the majority of those involved believe the exercise is yielding dividends.

“This sort of pace is normal at the start of negotiations. About half of the IGC group were not involved in the Westendorp examination and this has enabled them to get to grips with the issues involved. Equally, it has helped to start national debates on the IGC,” says one close observer.

There are now signs that the Italian EU presidency is preparing to speed up the negotiations, largely to avoid a simple repetition of opening bargaining positions in the second round of talks.

The group's chairman Silvio Fagiolo wants his colleagues to concentrate on a reduced list of subjects and, to keep up the pressure, the Italians are also drafting new treaty articles - a tactic the incoming Irish presidency will also adopt.

“The last two months have clarified majority and minority positions, and emphasised where we need to work to reach compromises. The document we will table at the Florence summit will contain consolidated positions on which the Irish and Dutch will be able to work to find the required solutions,” explains an Italian diplomat.

Fagiolo's approach has taken some participants slightly by surprise. But history has shown that Italy is not afraid to force the pace in IGC negotiations. It did so at the Milan summit in 1985 which led to the Single European Act and again at the Rome summit in October 1990 which gave impetus to the single currency plan.

The nature of the IGC group's discussions has also changed markedly in the past few weeks as it has begun to tackle some of the key questions which must be answered if the Union is to establish a more credible external identity and function effectively with an increased membership.

“The last two to three weeks have focused on the centre piece of the conference which will ultimately determine its success or failure. This revolves around institutional structure, decision-making, policy flexibility and the relationship with the Western European Union (WEU),” says one experienced diplomat.

The potential obstacle of neutrality, which was identified earlier by a number of pessimists, now appears less of a stumbling block in attempts to strengthen the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

“There is a noticeable readiness by the Austrians, Finns and Swedes to talk. They acknowledge that the world has changed and are willing to contribute to the discussions in a spirit of openness and to address questions of security and defence,” confirms one participant.

Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring has struck a similarly positive note, indicating that he believes the Union should be better equipped to contribute to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations - the so-called Petersberg tasks identified by Europe's defence arm, the WEU.

It is increasingly likely there will be general agreement that the Petersberg tasks should be written into the revised Maastricht treaty, but it is equally clear that supporters of the full scale integration of the WEU into the Union will be disappointed.

“There is a real dividing line on security and defence, particularly over the collective defence commitment in Article 5 of the WEU treaty. It is clear that neutrals and the UK are not ready to swallow that now, while others say they cannot imagine a political community in the long-term without this commitment,” says one senior official.

Increasingly aware that the leap to a European defence identity is now only a remote possibility at this IGC, advocates of giving the EU new responsibility in this area - especially France and Spain - are trying to lay down basic foundation stones to be built on later. Thus the current treaty proviso of a common defence policy “which might in time lead to a common defence” will probably be reworded into the harder commitment of “which will lead to a common defence”.

The idea of a foreign policy analysis unit is now widely accepted. “It is like apple pie and motherhood,” explains one somewhat cynical diplomat.

Similarly, a little more light is being shed on the way ahead in moves towards institutional reform and simpler decision-making.

But progress will be slow. Member states acknowledge the need to extend majority voting, but cannot agree where the unanimity rule should be scrapped, and the months ahead will see them examine possible areas on a painful case-by-case basis.

Similarly, the collective will that exists to reduce the complexity of EU decision-making does not extend to agreement on how this should be achieved.

Opposition to extending the European Parliament's shared legislative powers is being led by the UK and France - the first largely on doctrinal grounds, the second possibly for more tactical reasons in the hope of trade-offs elsewhere.

The potential scope of a general flexibility clause allowing certain groups of countries to integrate faster and more closely than others is also clearer now than it was a few months ago.

Only France and Germany believe it should be available in all EU policy areas, while others argue it is tactically naïve to raise the concept so early in the negotiations since it lessens pressure on governments to reach unanimous agreement in the talks.

They also point to the experience of the UK's social policy opt-out and maintain it would be highly counter-productive if this were allowed for Community, as opposed to intergovernmental, policies.

Instead, there is growing acceptance that the concept could apply to foreign policy and justice and home affairs, but on a case-by-case basis. For instance, a large majority support the transfer of visa, asylum and migration issues from the current intergovernmental arrangements to the Union framework.

Seasoned observers draw a distinction between these substantive issues which will determine how the EU operates and the more rhetorical political items on the IGC agenda such as employment, openness and bringing the Union closer to its citizens.

“It is clear people are raising the issue of unemployment as they feel it is expected of them by their citizens back home. But whatever is in the treaty will have little direct impact,” warns one observer.

Nevertheless, it is clear that a majority of governments - in the face of German and British opposition - believe there should be a separate chapter on employment in the new treaty, although all agree that the primary responsibility for creating jobs lies with member states.

The IGC negotiators are, however, only now having to face up to one of the most difficult dilemmas which must be resolved before real progress can be made.

“The real challenge is to keep this thing moving along. If the British do not reveal their hand, then there will be a tendency among others to be equally secretive or else to conduct negotiations as if just 14 governments were involved,” warned one senior diplomat.

Officials say participants face a crucial tactical choice.

“There are a number of issues, particularly on justice and home affairs and the role of the European Court of Justice, where the line up is 14 to one. Now it becomes a question of tactics. Do we move on to real negotiations and risk isolating the UK? Some countries favour this, but others do not,” says one.

How the Italian presidency reconciles these conflicting pressures in the coming four weeks will determine both the atmosphere and nature of the remaining IGC debate, and history's verdict on Rome's six-month stint at the EU helm.