Revolt against Barroso: defeat for MEPs’ chiefs

By Dana Spinant

Date: 09/12/04

The withdrawal of the first Commission team, following the European Parliament's threat to reject the line-up presented by José Manuel Barroso in October, was a defeat for the leaders of the two largest political groups in Parliament. It was caused by the refusal of MEPs from the Socialist (PES) and European People's Party (EPP-ED) to follow their leaders.

It may also be the consequence of a higher than usual 'renewal' of Parliament's ranks, ie a larger intake of newly elected MEPs, and of a more confrontational style brought in by deputies from the new member states.

Barroso stepped back from the brink on 27 October, on the eve of a vote that would have seen his first Commission team rejected. The mistake which brought him so close to defeat was to rely on promises from the leaders of the PES and EPP-ED that they could deliver the necessary votes.

Barroso only realized that his Commission had no chance of being approved on the evening beforehand, when he met the PES and the Liberal Democrats (ALDE), and when he got wind of hostility to his team in some quarters of the EPP-ED.

He had refused to redistribute mandates within his team to placate the critics, as Martin Schulz (PES) and Hans-Gert Pöttering (EPP-ED) thought that the presented line-up would pass anyway. They overestimated "the extent to which they could control their troops," according to one senior Parliament official.

"The fiasco of the first Barroso line-up was the result of a revolt of ordinary deputies against their bosses: MEPs refused to follow the obscure deal of their political group leaders," the official says.

"The group leaders did not consult them before promising Barroso, at the conference of presidents [the leaders of the political groups], that he would get support from their groups. Deputies simply refused to follow," he adds.

After a meeting with Parliament's group leaders on 21 October, Barroso decided to keep his new team exactly the way it was, despite calls for him to give the Italian nominee Rocco Buttiglione a new portfolio. MEPs did not trust Buttiglione, who had made controversial comments on homosexuality and women, to be a good justice and home affairs commissioner.

"Barroso decided to be inflexible and play poker with us because Schulz and Pöttering promised him that he would have no headache: that their MEPs would back him," an EPP-ED deputy says. "He realized too late that that was not true, hence the decision to withdraw."

Insiders believe the main reason why MEPs failed to obey the 'group discipline' was the strength of their reaction against Buttiglione's comments.

Secondly, MEPs revolted against the 'technical deals' which are customarily struck by the two largest groups in Parliament, which blur any political distinction.

The high percentage of newly elected MEPs is part of the explanation.

"Fresh MEPs do not understand why the left and the right get in cosy agreements on all issues," one newly elected deputy says.

"We come from different traditions in national politics, which is much more confrontational: there is left and right, there is white and black, and not a perpetual grey, where everything floats in 'technical deals', never ideological ones.

"What is then the point of voters choosing to vote for the right or left, if the result is an eternal deal between the two and basically it does not matter how you vote, you'll get the same anyway?"

With a replacement rate in excess of 50% (usually elections bring 30-40% new MEPs), the newly elected deputies played a role in the confirmation of the Barroso team, insiders say.

"Parliament has for a long time functioned on technical deals, which cultivated the impression that it is not a political place," one EPP-ED official says.

These deals stem from a general consensus among the PES and EPP-ED on the broad line: they are both in favour of EU integration. That made them feel that they were not in opposition to each other and that "instead of being black and white, they are light-grey and dark-grey", the official adds.

"Pöttering and other 'old' MEPs feel more comfortable about making a technical deal with the Socialists, so that they do not bother, they do not need to work and convince other members to follow or support them.

"It's just easier to make a technical deal. The trouble is, this is killing politics."

One Spanish MEP believes that the decision of many deputies not to follow their leaders' accord to support the first Barroso team is also the consequence of the emergence of a European public opinion.

"A colleague said she would vote for the Commission but then she got a phone call from her mother who asked her how she could support a Commission that included somebody like Buttiglione," he says.

"Another said he would back Barroso but he was under pressure from people from his constituency who were strongly contesting Buttiglione's comments.

"I think the public's reactions, the media comments and debates had an impact on MEPs' decisions. This is one reason why the group discipline broke down."

One Commission official believes that this experience sapped the influence of Parliament's group leaders and will affect Barroso's future behaviour.

"Group leaders speak, on paper, for a certain number of people, but in reality they may not. Barroso cannot be sure in the future that Pöttering speaks for 268 MEPs or Schulz for 202. I think he learned the lesson."

Major analysis feature, in which the author suggests that the withdrawal of the first team of European Commissioners, following the European Parliament's threat to reject the line-up presented by José Manuel Barroso in October, was a defeat for the leaders of the two largest political groups in Parliament. It was caused, says the author, by the refusal of MEPs from the Socialist (PES) and European People's Party (EPP-ED) to follow their leaders.