Representative systems and policy punctuations

Abstract:

This article examines how the characteristics of political institutions impact the extensiveness of budget punctuations. We develop a theory based on an adaptive systems framework from policy process studies of budgeting, and posit that institutional factors that impede democratic responsiveness lead to inefficiencies that cause policy changes to become more punctuated.

Based on previous research on policy responsiveness, we hypothesize that national budgets become more punctuated with increases in federalism, electoral proportionality and executive dominance. We test our theory using Eurostat and International Monetary Fund (COFOG) budget data from 24 countries over the period 1996–2011. Our results strongly support the proposition that more federalized systems produce more budget punctuations, but provide only weak support for the propositions that proportional systems and those with dominant executives do so.

The general proposition that institutions can impede the efficient processing of information receives some support, and warrants further investigation.