Removing conceptual blinders: Under what conditions does the ‘democratic deficit’ affect institutional design decisions?

Article abstract:

This paper pursues two objectives, one theoretical the other empirical. First, by keeping separate two grand strands in the EU studies literature, one on the design and reform of EU institutions and the other on the EU's 'democratic deficit', EU scholars are foreclosing the opportunity to address a hitherto unanswered question: When and under what conditions does the 'democratic deficit' - as it is perceived by political élites in the Member States - carry institutional design implications? Does the 'democratic deficit' really matter to political élites, and if this is the case, how does it matter? Will it inform political élites' preferences and choices for institutional design and change? By conceptualising the 'democratic deficit' as a value of the independent variable, we are guided to ask when and under what conditions it informs decisions for institutional design and reform. This paper will develop a set of propositions linking political elites' perceptions about a 'democratic deficit' and their institutional design preferences. Secondly, to test the plausibility of these propositions, they will be subjected to empirical scrutiny. The paper shows that the creation and empowerment of the European Parliament can be accounted for by applying the propositions elaborated in this paper. Hence, a question that has puzzled students of European integration since the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) - why national governments have successively bestowed the European Parliament (EP) with powers (supervisory, budgetary, and legislative) - can only be answered by exploring the conditions under which the 'democratic deficit' - as perceived by political elites - will carry institutional design implications.