Reforming European Union Financial Regulation: Thinking through Governance Models

This article examines the relationships between governance structures and regulatory approaches. It develops a typology to explain and fine-tune supranational regulatory models for the governance of markets.

The article suggests, firstly, a range of regulatory options which are defined according to two dimensions: (a) the degree of centralization of regulation, which includes networks, meta-organizations, and single central authorities; and (b) the degree of invasiveness of regulation, which ranges from sunshine regulation to command and control approaches. The aim is to relate structural alternatives (considered in terms of centralization) to regulatory approaches (considered in terms of invasiveness). The typology here constructed is applied to analyse the governance structure of EU competition law. Secondly, the article focuses on the recent structural changes reshaping the governance of European financial markets.

The reform is discussed through the lens of the typology. It appears that, differently from what was observed in the EU competition law model, the newly established European Supervisory Agencies (ESAs) are part of a complex structural development, in which the separation between a highly invasive regulatory approach and a decentralised supervisory structure adds further complexity. The article concludes by noting a set of possible normative implications, suggested by the typology, to ensure a consistent governance model for financial markets regulation and supervision in the EU.