Reconciling polls with ‘legitimacy crisis’

By Stanley Crossick

Date: 09/09/04

THE latest Eurobarometer poll published over the summer provokes a number of questions about the relationship between the EU and its citizens (July 2004 at www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.htm).

Almost twice as many respondents in the 25 EU member states had a positive image of the Union and 80% supported the new constitution.

A comparison of trust and distrust in institutions finds 41% trusting the EU and 41% distrusting, whereas the equivalent trust ratings for national parliaments are 32-57, national governments 28-63 and political parties as low as 14-77.

In response to EU policies, of those polled:

• 82% want an EU common position in an international crisis;
• 75% believe that the EU should have a foreign policy independent of the United States;
• 70% support a rapid military reaction force;
• 70% want common immigration and asylum policies;
• 60% would like an EU seat on the UN Security Council;
• 60% would like an EU foreign minister, and;
• 40% believe that the EU should take defence-related decisions.

There are some interesting results from the country with the most negative attitude towards the EU - the United Kingdom:

• The UK is the only member state opposed to the constitution - even Denmark supports it 41% to 37%;
• the UK is one of three countries which have a negative image of the Union (together with Austria and Sweden);
• not even the UK has a majority opposed to EU membership (29-29), and;
• although only 19% of British respondents trust the Union, this is the same percentage as trust their own government, with only 10% trusting political parties.

How should these poll results be reconciled with the crisis over legitimacy and popularity that the EU is supposed to be facing?

A quick check of democratic accountability reveals that the main decision-making authority, the Council of Ministers, consists of ministers representing 25 democratically elected governments, who remain in office only as long as the executives enjoy the confidence of their national parliaments. The European Parliament, the co-legislator, is directly elected. The European Commission is nominated by directly elected governments and approved (and dismissable) by the directly elected Parliament. The lack of legitimacy is clearly a misconception.

There is no doubt that the EU is not loved but again the Eurobarometer results shed some light on this. The EU's unpopularity is relative: national governments, parliaments and political parties can hardly be considered popularity contest winners - in fact, on the whole they are even less loved.

These conclusions appear to bode well for ratification of the EU constitution. While all national parliaments are expected to approve the constitutional treaty, at least one-third of the member states will hold referenda. If the ratification campaigns are fought strictly on EU issues, the prognosis looks generally good.

So often, however, domestic issues substantially influence the result and the vote is frequently a confidence vote in the government. The electorate is only given the choice of whether their continuing membership of the Union should be with or without the new constitution. If voters were asked whether they wanted to leave the Union the result might be different. The voters do not address what happens if they reject the treaty, even though it would have substantial consequences.

Those of us who believe in further European integration look back nostalgically to the halcyon days of Jacques Delors as president of the Commission. Today, however, with Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac to deal with, rather than Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, Delors would be frustrated and probably ineffective.

The problem is not the EU's unpopularity. Why should Brussels, the sum total of 25 constituent parts, be popular when most of the national governments, and indeed political classes, are unpopular?

The deep concern is whether the weak current leadership is conjunctural or structural. In a world undergoing intense change with an accent on short-termism, perhaps today's high-speed society, with its instant mass communication and destructive media, militates against effective leadership.

So what is likely to happen in the UK in the event of, say, it being the only one of 25 member states rejecting the constitutional treaty? The new treaty clearly could not take effect. There appear to be five possibilities:

• Changes not strictly requiring the new treaty be effected but nothing else be done;
• a non-binding declaration be agreed apparently meeting UK concerns and a second referendum be held, and hopefully won;
• the UK agrees to leave the Union if the new treaty is not ratified;
• all, or those of the 24 who are willing, enter into a new treaty, or;
• all, or those of the 24 who are willing, enter into an extensive enhanced cooperation.

The first possibility would not be satisfactory as treaty changes are required to equip the Union to cope with the new member states. The fourth would be a legal minefield and the fifth might be achievable but would be very cumbersome. That leaves possibilities two and three. The first of these resolved previous rejections of EU treaties, in Denmark and Ireland.

Although window-dressing, it might be achievable, particularly if it is made clear that the alternative will be possible withdrawal. Under the second, the British electorate can be asked in a referendum either to agree to leave the EU or to approve the constitutional treaty.

Of course, legally the UK would not be bound to do anything, but politically inaction would be untenable.

• Stanley Crossick, founding chairman of the European Policy Centre, Brussels, writes here in a personal capacity.

Analysis feature in which the author, founding chairman of the European Policy Centre, compares the low level of popular support for the EU institutions to the sometimes even lower level of support for national institutions. He goes on to discuss the consequences of a negative outcome in the UK referendum on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe.

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