Radical right parties and European economic integration: Evidence from the seventh European Parliament

Abstract:

This article explores the differences in radical right parties' voting behaviour on economic matters at the European Parliament. As the literature highlights the heterogeneity of these parties in relation to their economic programmes, we test whether divergences survive the elections and translate into dissimilar voting patterns.

Using voting records from the seventh term of the European Parliament, we show that radical right parties do not act as a consolidated party family. We then analyse the differences between radical right parties by the means of different statistical methods (NOMINATE, Ward's clustering criterion, and additive trees) and find that these are described along two dimensions: the degree of opposition to the European Union and the classical left–right economic cleavage. We provide a classification of these parties compromising four groups: pro-welfare conditional, pro-market conditional, and rejecting.

Our results indicate that radical right parties do not act as a party family at the European Parliament. This remains true regardless of the salience of the policy issues in their agendas. The article also derives streams for future research on the heterogeneity of radical right parties.