‘Quiet superpower’ needs military might

Date: 30/04/03

Calls for a European defence indentity separate from NATO have gathered momentum since the Iraq crisis. Dana Spinant argues that without an effective military capacity the EU risks being a failed civilian power

THE Iraq crisis has fuelled a view among some that the EU must develop its military might if it is to make its voice heard on the world stage and influence the United States'foreign policy.

The argument runs that, if Europe were as strong militarily as the US, Washington would have listened to it before launching the war. As the US only respects military power, the thinking goes, the EU will always be its junior partner unless it becomes a military power itself.

At their controversial defence mini-summit in Brussels on Tuesday (29 April), France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg pledged to boost the Union's defence policy. However, some warn this is a waste of time and resources.

Does the Union need to develop a military dimension? Should it try to match the US in this field or, instead, develop civilian - economic and diplomatic - instruments to help stabilize trouble-spots?

Key European politicians and academics claim the EU does not need to be powerful militarily in order to make its voice heard in Washington.

Andrew Moravcsik, director of EU studies at Harvard University, says the Union's destiny is as a civilian power which "can win without an army".

"When it comes to the essential instruments for carrying out this task [winning the peace] there is also one superpower: the quiet superpower - Europe."

He argues that being a "civilian superpower" is a comparative advantage. Successive enlargements, the EU's sizeable funding for development aid, peacekeeping and support for international institutions all contribute to the spread of stability and security.

Moreover, Moravcsik believes a European military force would not necessarily stop American unilateralism. "Do Europeans propose to use military force against the US? Launch pre-preventive interventions?" he asks rhetorically.

Nevertheless, others believe that the EU's military weakness may encourage a unilateralist attitude in Washington.

As the Union is no valuable military partner, why would the US need European accord to launch a war?

If the EU cannot share the burden in military actions, why would it be involved in the decision-making?

In addition, if the EU developed its military might, would it not boost the effectiveness of its civilian action? A civilian power, as described by French academic François Duchene in 1972, is "short on weapons but long on economic power". Its objective is to diffuse civilian and democratic standards across the world.

But how can democratic principles be promoted without ever having to use force?

A civilian power can only be potent if backed by an army: military force is sometimes necessary to uphold civil values.

However, supporters of a 'soft power' approach believe that the development of an EU military force would result in competition between the two sides of the Atlantic.

Europe and America are already economic rivals, regularly slugging it out at the World Trade Organization. If the EU becomes a military power to rival the US, their relationship would be based almost entirely on competition.

In order to be an indispensable partner to Washington, the Union should develop civilian instruments - economic and diplomatic - for deterring security threats, they claim. The US neither possesses nor is willing to develop such instruments.

By going this way, Europe and the US would complement each other - one specialising in soft security and the other in hard, military security.

The logic of this is that the US would need and respect the EU more as a solid partner in conflict prevention, reconstruction and nation-building - none of Washington's strengths - than if it were a junior military rival.

Developing complementary strengths would result in Washington consulting Brussels more closely before launching any military attack or on preparing for the aftermath.

The US would need the EU to reconstruct nations to avoid the development of rogue states.

Seductive as it is, this logic ignores the argument that Europe needs military force to guarantee the success of its non-military instruments and fulfil its part of the 'contract'.

The EU neither needs, nor is ready to develop, military powers to equal the United States. Europe will never spend the money to rival the US defence outlay: it would need to double - at least - its defence budget from 2 of GDP to overcome a decades-long US lead.

The European public is simply not ready to accept this.

Nevertheless, the Union must develop a defence identity and military capacity to help it use its civilian instruments strategically, not randomly.

It will need to formulate a security doctrine to underpin its external actions and decide on a plan to enable it to spread democracy.

If it fails to do so, the Union will be a failed civilian power.

Europe needs to evolve from its current status of being a 'by default' civilian power (the result of a lack of military capabilities) and become a 'by design' one.

Calls for a European defence indentity separate from NATO have gathered momentum since the Iraq crisis. In this analysis the author argues that without an effective military capacity the EU risks being a failed civilian power.