Author (Person) | Schoeller, Magnus G. |
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Series Title | Journal of European Public Policy |
Series Details | Vol.24, No.1, January 2017, p1-20 |
Publication Date | January 2017 |
ISSN | 1350-1763 |
Content Type | Journal | Series | Blog |
Abstract: Throughout the eurozone crisis, observers called upon Germany to assume leadership. Yet, Germany has not emerged as the hoped-for leader. According to the issue at stake, we observe three different outcomes: firstly, Germany refused to lead; secondly, Germany assumed leadership, but failed to deliver; thirdly, Germany acted as a successful leader. This article examines the reasons for this variance by analysing and comparing one case for each outcome: the first financial assistance to Greece; the failed attempt to establish a ‘super-commissioner'; and the shaping of the Fiscal Compact. The analysis includes original data, gathered through interviews in Brussels, Frankfurt and Berlin. The variance in Germany's behaviour can be explained by employing a rational institutionalist model of leadership. Germany's emergence as a leader depends on the expected costs and benefits of leading. Its impact, in contrast, depends on its power, the distribution of preferences among the actors involved and institutional constraints. |
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Source Link | Link to Main Source http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1146325 |
Countries / Regions | Europe, Germany |