Primus inter pares? the parliamentarisation and presidentialisation of the European Commission: between European integration and organisational dynamics

With the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice the President of the Commission gained in influence vis-à-vis the College of Commissioners resulting in a process of Presidentialisation. At the same time the European Parliament gained in influence over the European Commission resulting in a process of Parliamentarisation. The aim of this thesis is to explain these processes. Why
are we seeing such a leadership emerge within the Commission, and why is the EP gaining in influence?

Employing intergovernmental theory, I show that the member states retain the formal power to revise the Treaty framework, and may be said to be the primary actors. Using this prerogative they have made the Commission an
efficient institution, while at the same time limiting the influences of the Parliament. Employing rational choice institutionalism I arrive at slightly different conclusions. Focusing on the European institutions’ adaptation of the formal provisions, this interpretation shows that the institutions influence their own roles and functions as they maximise their mandates. A third and
final analysis employing organisational theory focusing on the institutional environment show that norms and ideas are used as arguments for the Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission, and seem to
be used to legitimise the institutions.