Pride and prejudice sour the celebrations

Date: 29/04/04

As Europe reunites on 1 May, the party will be spoiled by unfinished business: Cyprus. The Mediterranean island will enter the Union divided, with only its Greek south - which rejected unification in a referendum last weekend - set to enjoy EU membership. How to solve this enlargement "leftover"? David Cronin reports from Nicosia

Coils of barbed wire mark the EU's new border. They lend a menacing undertone to the calm of Nicosia in the afternoon sun. UN soldiers stroll nonchalantly in the surrounding buffer zone. A short distance away, Turkish Cypriot children smile radiantly, as they try out their English on visiting journalists.

Cyprus is not Iraq, Kosovo or Ulster. The last time someone died here due to civil strife was in 1996, when a Greek Cypriot nationalist was shot by Turkish troops as he tried to pull down their national flag.

But even if people are not killing each other, the island remains a source of considerable tension in the eastern Mediterranean. Dwarfed by neighbouring Turkey, its diminutive size belies its geopolitical importance. Historically, a bone of contention between ancient foes, though current NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, it also hosts the UK's "sovereign bases", the nexus of its intelligence-gathering on the Middle East.

As the Cyprus problem has now been dragged into the European Union, it looks set to cause headaches for EU policymakers for years to come.

In many ways, the Union has been held hostage to the decision made by its leaders at the 1999 Helsinki summit. Then, they decided that a reunification of the island - divided since the arrival of Turkish troops in 1974 - would not be a precondition for Cyprus' EU membership.

That decision was taken at a time when ageing Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash was perceived to be the main obstacle to a settlement.

Yet, although Denktash has steadfastly opposed the plan for uniting the island sponsored by UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan, some 65% of his community voted in favour of it in last weekend's referenda.

So it turned out that the wrecker of a settlement was Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos, who convinced 75% of his electorate to oppose the Annan Plan.

The absolutist position he adopted met with deep anger from the international community. Günter Verheugen, the European enlargement commissioner, went so far as accusing Papadopoulos of deceiving him. It was an unprecedented outburst by a member of the Commission against a state on the verge of EU membership.

Papadopoulos' stance confused many observers. Although he is a hardline nationalist and a veteran of the EOKA guerrillas that fought for independence from Britain, the president had indicated his desire for a settlement.

Most observers believe that the Annan Plan offered one on the best terms he could have hoped for. As Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president who became involved in the Irish peace process during the 1990s observed, its 9,000-pages are "much better than most" proposals for conflict resolution.

For example, its provisions on demilitarization appear more watertight than those in the 1998 Belfast Agreement on Northern Ireland. Under the Annan Plan, the number of Turkish soldiers on the island would be reduced from today's estimated figure of 45,000 to 650.

"By rejecting the possibility to have 650 troops on the island, Papadopolous has accepted that 45,000 will remain," observed an appalled Turkish Cypriot on the "Yes" side.

Similarly, the clauses relating to the return of property to those forced from their homes in 1974 appear as generous as was realistically possible. Within three years, up to half of the 160,000 Greek Cypriots affected would be able to return to their old homes.

The recent referenda also highlight the significant power that the Greek Orthodox church wields in Cyprus. Its hierarchy has warned that the Annan Plan represented a threat to the Orthodox "character" of the island, with one bishop even telling his congregation that eternal damnation could be the price of voting "Yes". Interestingly, the church seemed to be supportive of EU membership, regarding it as a chance to finally receive "enosis", the long-cherished ideal of unity with "motherland" Greece.

By contrast, religious figures do not appear to have had any major role in the debate on the Turkish Cypriot side. Despite Islam being the main religion among Turkish Cypriots, even some of its most belligerent politicians pride themselves on the secular nature of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a state recognized only by Ankara.

At this juncture, it is difficult to predict if the Annan Plan is defunct. Annan himself said this week that no further international initiatives aimed at solving the Cyprus problem would be undertaken for the time being.

Nevertheless, some Greek Cypriot politicians have held out the prospect that there could be a further referendum on a modified version of the plan in the near future. These include Demetris Christofias, general-secretary of AKEL, the biggest party on the island. This left-leaning party had surprised many by calling for a "No" vote, when it has long been involved in cross-community activities. Yet it has pledged to switch to the "Yes" side in a fresh poll, provided the UN Security Council gives guarantees on the plan's implementation.

In the immediate future, one thing looks certain. Papadopoulos will be the least popular EU leader attending this Saturday's (1 May) EU enlargement celebrations in Dublin.

In legal terms, Cyprus' power within the EU has not diminished due to the absence of a settlement. But in political and economic terms, it is a different matter.

The international community has already decided that the Greek Cypriots would receive none of the €2 billion pledged at the 15 April donors' conference on Cyprus if they voted "No".

Moreover, the Greek Cypriots' scope for building alliances, a crucial ability in the horse-trading that can characterize EU decision-making, could be limited because they have incurred the wrath of their peers.

There would appear to be two options for Papadopoulos and his government. The first is that it could become more hardline, to the point of using its veto against Turkey's attempts to start negotiations on its EU accession bid. It could also use its veto in such matters as integrating Croatia into the EU. After all, Papadopoulos has backed Serbian nationalists in the past.

The second option is that it could prove that it is genuinely in favour of reaching out to the Turkish Cypriots and building a common future. This may appear unlikely given some of the feverish rhetoric among "No" campaigners on both sides of the island's ethnic divide. But it is hardly beyond the bounds of possibility.

Should common sense eventually prevail, then there might be a chance that the Cyprus problem is solved at last within the EU.

Only the Greek south of Cyprus entered the European Union on 1 May 2004 after its citizens rejected reunification of the island in a referendum on 24 April 2004. Article is part of a European Voice Special Report on EU Enlargement, and considers how to resolve the issue of the continued division of Cyprus.