Playing all sides

Date: 27/09/03

Soft talk in Washington does not mark a retreat from independence

TALK about a delicate exercise in oratory. When Gerhard Schröder, Germany's chancellor, took the floor at the United Nations in New York on September 24th to mark the 30th anniversary of his country joining the organisation, he had two conflicting aims: first, to reaffirm Germany's commitment to multilateralism and the rule of law in world affairs; second, to do so without annoying the United States and President George Bush, with whom he had just had the first meeting of substance since the transatlantic crisis over Iraq began last year.

Repairing relations with Mr Bush will, however, take more than a speech and a meeting. Though in no way disavowing its renewed closeness to France, Germany is once again trying to play all sides and to present itself as a mediator - much as it did before the row over the war in Iraq. But does this mean that Germany is edging back towards its old unalloyed friendship with America? Mr Schröder's decision to side openly with France over Iraq was the first time since the second world war that a German government had decided so bluntly, in a major transatlantic issue, to oppose the Americans. Many thought that Germany's stand over Iraq, along with its apparently growing keenness for an independent European defence arm, marked a tectonic shift.

Many within Germany's foreign-policy establishment hope not. For sure, Germany plainly no longer depends on the Americans as it did before the Berlin wall came down. But if Germany's embrace of the anti-American French were to get still tighter, the country - argues Ulrike Guerot of the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin - would no longer be able to serve as the glue between Europe and the United States, between the western and eastern parts of Europe, and between large and small countries in the European Union. The rancour between Europeans over Iraq, she says, has demonstrated the risks of that approach.

Hence Germany's “swing back”, as Ms Guerot puts it. Nearly all foreign-policy pundits, including those in the foreign ministry, in the opposition and, most important, in the chancellor's office, are now singing the same tune. A European counterweight to the Americans? Forget it, even if Europeans had the military punch. A European defence capability? Yes, but not in opposition to NATO. A different policy on Iraq? No, not now: let's stop the blame game and work together to make Iraq more peaceful.

But it will not be easy to win back American favour. Joschka Fischer, Germany's foreign minister, remains adamant that no German soldier will be sent to Iraq. Nor have the cash-strapped Germans offered much towards rebuilding the place. But they have offered to train Iraqi policemen and soldiers. And the Germans have said they are willing to send more troops to Afghanistan, where, under NATO command, they have the largest contingent.

Does this add up to a return to German “predictability”, as Atlanticists have hoped? Not yet. A debate about Germany's national interest, long avoided because of the historical baggage of German guilt, is under way. People are asking whether it is really to Germany's advantage to deploy soldiers in the more dangerous parts of Afghanistan, or indeed in Iraq. Good European that he is, Mr Fischer sticks to the old post-world-war doctrine that, for Germany, the European interest and the national interest are the same thing. But a growing number are taking a more robustly self-interested view.

Even if the foreign-policy establishment wants to get back into America's favour, the public is less sure. Pollsters say that only 45% now think that strong American leadership in world affairs is desirable, against 68% a year ago. By contrast, the number of those who want the EU to become a superpower has risen from 48% to 70%, though a large majority still thinks that Europe should co-operate rather than compete with the United States.

As a result, politicians and pundits, even on the right, are much warier of sounding pro-American. For instance, after Mr Bush's speech on Iraq earlier this month, that bastion of Atlanticism, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, called his demands for international help “unreasonable”. These days one of Germany's favourite American authors is Michael Moore, a virulently anti-Bush icon of the American left. His books “Stupid White Men” and “Downsize this! Random Threats from an Unarmed American” are topping Germany's bestseller charts, while his documentary film, “Bowling for Columbine”, is packing the cinemas.

Much depends on Mr Schröder. He has apparently decided to focus more on international affairs, perhaps because his foreign policy is a lot more popular than his plans for painful reform at home. On September 20th his Social Democrats were thrashed in Bavaria's state election, not even winning 20% of the vote against the conservative Christian Social Union's 60%-plus. Bavaria has long been a conservative stronghold, but this showing was the Social Democrats' worst ever.

Mr Schröder has always tended to pander to public opinion. But in foreign policy he may have become more his own man. As the first post-war chancellor to have been brought up after the war (in which his father was killed), he is less burdened by feelings of national guilt. Germany, he believes, now deserves to take its place as one of the world's leading countries, with its foreign policy made at home. Indeed, in his speech in New York on September 24th, he again asked, indirectly, for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Indubitably, Mr Schröder wants to patch things up with the Americans. But relations with them, he reckons, should be more equal than in the past. Moreover, whoever is Germany's next chancellor will probably think the same.

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