| Author (Person) | Cronin, David |
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| Series Title | European Voice |
| Series Details | Vol.10, No.27, 22.7.04 |
| Publication Date | 22/07/2004 |
| Content Type | News |
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By David Cronin Date: 22/07/04 SHORTLY before the 2000 United States presidential election, Condoleezza Rice declared: "We don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten." The woman who would become national security advisor in the Bush administration was spelling out the "division of labour" she wished to see developing between military forces on both sides of the Atlantic. Peacekeeping in Europe's troublespots should be left to Europeans, she felt. America would busy itself with areas it perceived to be of greater strategic interest, such as the Persian Gulf. Four years later, her vision is close to reality. The EU is on the cusp of taking control of its biggest military operation to date with the launch of Operation Althea in Bosnia in late 2004. This is more than a simple baton-change from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). It underscores how America's presence in the Balkans has dwindled, while - in relative terms - Europe's has increased. When SFOR's precursor, the Implementation Force (IFOR) was formed following the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, the US provided one-third of its 60,000 troops. Today, the number of troops serving with SFOR stands at more than 7,000, just 900 of whom come from the US. Jean-Yves Haine, from the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, regards Althea as a step towards eventual US disengagement from the Balkans. He predicts that that will occur if the EU can show it is firmly in charge of peacekeeping in Bosnia and the question of how Kosovo will be governed on a long-term basis is resolved. "Once the final status of Kosovo is agreed, US troops will go home," he says. "The EU cannot afford to fail in Bosnia and especially in Kosovo." Without doubt, the l72 million operation will be a litmus test for the EU's still embryonic military structures. To emphasize that it is an autonomous EU operation, the Council of Ministers last week adopted preliminary guidelines stating that its chain of command will remain under the "political control and strategic direction" of the Union. For example, the Operation Commander, Germany's Rainer Feist, is to answer only to EU bodies, although some of these will liaise with NATO. The Alliance will be keeping a headquarters in Sarajevo. Staffed by around 300 US and 100 non-US troops, it will focus on providing intelligence on indicted war criminals and on potential terrorist attacks. From a political and moral point of view, the most pressing task for Althea will be ensuring that those indicted for crimes by The Hague-based tribunal on the former Yugoslavia are apprehended. Among those still at large are Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both suspected of being the masterminds of the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre. SFOR has come in for severe criticism from figures including the former UN Balkans envoy (and ex-Swedish premier) Carl Bildt for failing to track down the two fugitives. Although there is no guarantee that Althea will have a better track record, there are signs of a growing determination by international troubleshooters to catch them. The most concrete manifestation of this came on 30 June, when Paddy Ashdown, the EU and UN emissary in Sarajevo, dismissed 60 Bosnian Serb leaders and officials as a punishment for not arresting Karadzic by a stipulated deadline. "Before the EU's flag is raised [with the launch of Althea], Karadzic and Mladic must be apprehended," says Bertrand de Largentaye, from Notre Europe, the think-tank headed by former European Commission chief Jacques Delors. "It is necessary to get to the root of the evil." A recent report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) lists preventing weapons sales on the black market and reform of Bosnia's armed forces as the two other key areas of SFOR's "unfinished business", with which Althea will have to grapple. Conflict prevention advocates allude to evidence that surface-to-air missiles have been sold illegally, while other arms from Bosnia have found their way into the hands of Saddam Hussein's regime, the 'Real' IRA (the dissident republicans opposing the Irish peace process), the Kosovo Liberation Army and Spanish journalists posing as Colombian paramilitaries. The ICG also states that one of the greatest threats to Althea's success is the possibility that unrest in Kosovo could spill over into Bosnia. Already this year, events in Kosovo have had an impact on peacekeeping in Bosnia. When riots occurred in the disputed region in March, a contingent of NATO troops stationed in Bosnia was sent to Kosovo at a time when the alleged impotence of NATO to deal with ethnic violence was widely condemned. According to the ICG, there is a real risk of violence in Kosovo flaring up afresh in the coming year as the clamour from Kosovo Albanians that they be granted independence from Belgrade becomes more vociferous. Should independence be granted, this could prove a catalyst for Serbia to demand the formal partition of Republic Srpska, the Serb-dominated republic, from the rest of Bosnia as "compensation" for the loss of Kosovo. Unless a lid is kept on ethnic tensions in this volatile region, Operation Althea could suffer a major headache. |
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| Source Link | http://www.european-voice.com/ |
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| Subject Categories | Security and Defence |
| Countries / Regions | Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia |
