New military manoeuvres

Date: 17/04/1997

IT CAN be an unnerving experience when you are tentatively reassessing your personal situation and then learn of plans that others are making for your future.

That is the position which Europe's defence alliance, the Western European Union, (WEU) now finds itself in.

The independent organisation is currently seeking to clarify its relationship with two more powerful relatives: the EU and NATO.

Until recently, work on this issue was carried out almost exclusively by experts. But now the debate has been brought out into the open with the

suggestion that, over time, the intergovernmental WEU alliance should be fully integrated into the European Union.

France and Germany have placed the idea at the heart of the Intergovernmental Conference negotiations.

The scheme they have hatched, which is due to be discussed by foreign ministers at their next IGC talks at the end of the month, sets out a three-stage procedure to meet that goal.

No timetable exists, although those involved in the debate suggest that full WEU integration could be achieved within seven to ten years.

The Franco-German plan - officially supported by Spain, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg - has surprised many because of the degree of detail it sets out for each phase of the gradual administrative, political and military absorption of the WEU by the Union.

In a bid to pre-empt criticism from the Union's four neutral members (Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria) it specifically states that any EU member state would have the right not to participate in the WEU's mutual assistance mechanism under which countries must come to the military defence of a fellow member under attack.

It also aims to reassure Atlanticists by insisting that any “drifting apart of the defence commitments in the EU and NATO, which would weaken the transatlantic security link, must be avoided”.

Supporters of the initiative acknowledge that it raises fundamental questions about national sovereignty, transatlantic relations, the future role of NATO and the very nature of the Union itself, but insist it is a logical development for the EU.

The member state most opposed to the concept is the UK. The country's Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind warned his counterparts in Rome last month that it would mean governments making a commitment, for the first time in the EU's history, “to go to war if a member state is attacked or invaded”.

The UK objects to allowing the Union's four neutral members to play a part in determining a collective security policy to which they themselves are not committed. It also believes that it would increase Russian suspicions about the EU's eastward expansion.

Neutral member states share the UK's misgivings about the possible negative impact of the move on enlargement. But they support giving the Union responsibility for the Petersberg peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks and writing this into the revised treaty, arguing that this would be a major achievement in itself.

“The attraction for applicants of EU membership is not that we are a mutual defence organisation, but that the Union has the identity and scope for its members to help each other. We have to learn how to walk before learning to run. The bottom line is that the Petersberg tasks are achievable and are appropriate for the Union,” insists one neutral country diplomat.

Just as the EU is divided, so too is the WEU.

In its 1995 submission to the IGC, the defence organisation acknowledged two different views among its members on the way ahead: maintenance of the WEU's autonomy or an IGC agreement on the measures, objectives and timetable for moving towards eventual merger.

Fundamentally, the WEU has two basic reservations about the Franco-German initiative. First, there is a strong belief that the full integration of the WEU into the EU can only be achieved if all Union countries agree to be bound by a mutual defence commitment - something which neutral members find difficult to swallow.

Secondly, critics argue that the WEU's complex membership pattern - with full and associate members, observers and associate partners - would make it virtually impossible to shoehorn it into the Union.

Behind the current arguments, experienced observers hint that the Franco-German initiative could serve a wider tactical purpose.

“When talk of strengthening the European element in NATO is going okay, then there is little attempt to put the WEU on the stage. The opposite is also true, possibly as a gentle nudge to the US to show how far Europe is prepared to go,” suggests one EU diplomat.

Alongside the integration of the WEU, the other major unresolved area - and one which goes to the very heart of sensitivities over national sovereignty - is the Union's foreign policy decision-making process itself.

The Dutch presidency is suggesting that fundamental strategy be decided unanimously at the highest political level and that operational decisions in this area be taken by majority vote.

The unresolved question is: what is the highest political level?

For the French, the answer is simple: European summits. But EU leaders tend to gather only two to three times a year and their meetings are hardly structured to take such strategic decisions.

The search for ways to ensure that EU foreign policy decision-making becomes more efficient has also prompted at least one novel idea. Earlier this year, Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans van den Broek suggested a revised system should take account of the varying political, economic and military weight of member states.

This proposal - a personal, rather than a formal European Commission view - appears to have failed to attract any significant support, judging from the way it has been totally ignored in the IGC negotiations.

Elsewhere, the shape of an edifice to handle future EU foreign and security policy is beginning to emerge.

It will include a new foreign policy supremo - originally dubbed a Mr/Ms CFSP (common foreign and security policy), but now more coyly described as 'a prominent personality' - who will enjoy secretary-general status in the Council of Ministers.

The holder of this post will be charged with coordinating and providing continuity to EU policy. The identity of the first incumbent remains a mystery, although the decision on how to choose him or her will provide a clue.

If it lies within the gift of Union leaders, then the post could go to a high-profile politician such as former Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky or ex-Swedish Premier Carl Bildt. If the selection is made by EU ambassadors, the first holder may come from the diplomatic world.

In parallel, the Commission is preparing to end its practice of distributing foreign policy responsibilities, largely on geographical grounds, among several members of its 20-strong team. The current formula has been a recipe for rivalry and territorial battles.

“It is a mess right now with five Commissioners. During foreign ministers' lunches when a lot of subjects are discussed, it can happen that you get one Commissioner attending the first course, another the second and a third the dessert,” complained one senior official only partly in jest.

A more coherent front could be presented by appointing one Commission vice-president with specific overall responsibility assisted by three or four colleagues with sectoral or geographical tasks.

Further continuity would be provided by appointing the foreign policy supremos of both the Council and Commission to a revamped troika along with the holder of the rotating EU presidency.

“I feel the new troika is a winning idea and will happen. The question still to be resolved is whether its role will be just to represent the Union and implement decisions or whether it will play a part in conceptualising foreign policy and ensuring better coordination between all the economic and diplomatic aspects involved,” says one IGC observer.

In the 1991 negotiations leading up to the Maastricht Treaty, EU governments set themselves the ambitious target of a common foreign and security policy.

But without the means to reach their goal (the UK was not alone in insisting on unanimity), expectations have outweighed achievements.

“Now the situation has changed,” explains one negotiator. “The UK is effectively out of the negotiations and the debate has changed in nature. No one else is saying majority voting is impossible. But some are looking for something to protect their vital national interests if necessary. The question is how much of this do you actually write down in a treaty. That is what must be decided.”