Muslims in Europe: A growing band of brothers

Date: 06/03/04

The continuing debate among European Muslims over western political values

WHAT role will Europe's 12m or so Muslims play in the continent's affairs? Most people discern two possibilities. Either European Muslims will integrate seamlessly into their countries' political and economic life; or they will stay on the margins, nursing their rage.

In fact, both things are happening. As German citizens of Turkish origin acquire voting rights and wealth, and leading Muslims become regional governors in France or peers in Britain, there are healthy signs of a community gaining in status and respect. “The great majority of French Muslims are melting successfully into the social mainstream,” comments Soheib Bencheikh, the liberal mufti of Marseilles. But at the other extreme, a handful of ultra-militant preachers are offering moral and even material support to terrorism.

The strongest trend in the politics of European Islam lies somewhere in the middle. A new generation of European-born Muslims is learning to work effectively within their countries' laws and political systems. But it also draws spiritual and ideological inspiration from Islam's Middle Eastern heartland, and cherishes the hope that Islamic rule will prevail over secular government in Muslim countries.

An interesting pointer is the strong effort to dominate European Islam being mounted by sympathisers of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is a grass-roots movement to build an Islamic society from the bottom upwards that was spawned in Egypt in the early 20th century and spread, in the teeth of repression, across the Islamic world. The Brotherhood's principal ideologue is Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, a 77-year-old religious teacher, based in Qatar, who enjoys great moral standing in the Islamic diaspora, via his writings, broadcasts and websites. He also wields influence through a more formal channel: the Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research, of which he is president.

This council comprises 32 leading scholars, from Europe and the Middle East, whose self-appointed task is to ponder the dilemmas - moral, personal and political - faced by European Muslims. The issues they consider range from the religious (the posture and frequency of prayer) and the professional (can Muslims be full-time sportsmen?) to the realm of politics (can Muslims take part in local elections?). But they also touch on world affairs. For example the council has said that Jerusalem is Islamic land, and that its occupation by non-Muslims should be resisted by “all means ” - and also that suicide bombings in Israel are not subject to the usual Muslim strictures against taking one's own life, or that of non-combatants.

In 2001 European governments rejoiced when Sheikh Qaradawi roundly condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11th. But the scholar makes clear that he feels differently about suicide bombings in the “war zones” of the Middle East. He encourages keen but qualified participation in the western system, with the interests of Islam always in mind.

In the same spirit, Sheikh Suhaib Hasan Ahmed, a council member who runs a school and mosque in London, says it is legitimate for Muslims to be active in secular parties - but only if the parties advance Muslim concerns, such as aid to Islamic education, a change in divorce laws, and easier access to halal food. A Muslim politician must oppose his party if it goes against Islam, Sheikh Hasan says.

The reach of Sheikh Qaradawi extends to many different branches of Islam. Many of his council colleagues, such as Sheikh Hasan, are far from being Brotherhood sympathisers. But what about the direct influence exercised by the Muslim Brothers, whose Egyptian founder, Hasan al-Banna, wanted to re-Islamise society, and ultimately the state, by galvanising individuals, families and communities?

In several distinct ways, the legacy of al-Banna is being felt across Europe. One is through Sheikh Qaradawi. Another is through movements that follow the Brotherhood's ideology in a narrower sense, and are bidding to be the loudest Islamic voice in Europe - to the discomfort of other Muslims, who are more moderate or, in a few cases, more extreme.

Ask a resident of Lyons or Marseilles which movement speaks for the Muslim Brothers, and you will be directed to the Union of Islamic Organisations in France (UOIF). This is a well-organised constellation of smaller groups that increasingly dominates the politics of the country's 4.5m Muslims. To the alarm of older Muslim leaders, the UOIF and other tough-talking factions swept the board in last year's elections to local branches of the new French Council for the Muslim Faith.

The presidency of this council remains in the cautious hands of Dalil Boubakeur, grand mufti of Paris; he is an admirer of French civilisation who laments the “contest of extremism” among his fellow Muslims. But the regional branches are so dominated by the UOIF that a takeover of the entire council is within its grasp. One official who watched the council's establishment comments that “the militants have left Boubakeur in place, but they are biding their time.” Moderate French Muslims think that the government - and especially Nicolas Sarkozy, the interior minister - was naive, at best, in letting pro-Brotherhood groups build such a commanding position. But officials say that drawing Brotherhood supporters into the system has, on balance, been worthwhile. They point out that, because it was co-opted by officialdom, the UOIF was unable to support protests against a ban on Muslim headscarves in public schools and other state institutions.

In Britain, the most vocal exponents of Brotherhood thinking are in the Muslim Association of Britain, which gained prominence last year as a co-organiser of protest marches against the Iraq war. This association is among the constituent groups of the Muslim Council of Britain, a broader body that is valued by the government as an interlocutor. When, as has happened several times, the association is attacked in Parliament for condoning violence in the Middle East, the council leaps to its defence. Yet in Britain, as in France, co-existence between “brothers and others” has not always been easy.

How can an outsider distinguish between different schools of politically active Muslims? One touchstone issue is how Muslims' role in Europe - past, present and future - is conceived. Emollient figures, such as the muftis of Marseilles and Paris, speak of how much their values and those of post-enlightenment Europe have in common; they say Muslims have much to learn from their non-Muslim compatriots. Those who take their cue from the Brotherhood put more emphasis on the ideal of Islamic governance in Muslim countries. This implies that secular democracy, while tolerable in the West, is not a perfect system.

The views of Tariq Ramadan are an ingenious bid to synthesise the two camps. As he puts it, there are values, such as equal citizenship, accountability or the rule of law, that are reflected (albeit not yet perfectly) in western democracy - but can also be expressed in ways that are closer to Islam's history and culture. Where Sheikh Qaradawi counsels European Muslims to protect themselves as a minority, Mr Ramadan prefers the language of “equal citizenship”, implying rights and obligations. Nor, he says, should the UOIF be horse-trading with Mr Sarkozy: this compromises their dignity.

Is there any reason why non-Muslims need follow such intra-Islamic arguments? So far only a handful of Muslims have entered European politics, and most have been individuals of Islamic heritage rather than people whose central concern is to promote the faith. But that is changing; at the next British general election, for example, Labour is fielding two Muslim activists in safe seats. The big question is how much Europe will be changed by politicians who play by democratic rules but also live, and see the world, in the light of a faith to which other loyalties are subordinate. The answer may be: quite a lot.

There is a continuing debate among European Muslims over western political values.

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