| Author (Person) | Emerson, Michael |
|---|---|
| Series Title | European Voice |
| Series Details | Vol.9, No.40, 27.11.03, p16 |
| Publication Date | 27/11/2003 |
| Content Type | News |
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Date: 27/11/03 THE bloodless coup in Georgia last weekend has been much in the news. However, equally serious things have been happening in Moldova, which have attracted far less attention. The strategic, geopolitical future of Moldova is being considered at the Maastricht meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) foreign ministers on 1-2 December. On the table is a detailed memorandum shaping the constitution of a Federal Republic of Moldova, proposed by Russia. This follows years of unfruitful negotiations sponsored by the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine to resolve the problem of Transdniestria's unrecognized secession. The text is being promoted diplomatically by Dmitri Kozak, a senior figure on President Vladimir Putin's staff. This Russian text proposes the basic principles of a new constitution for what would become the Federal Republic of Moldova, consisting of a federal territory and two "subjects" of the federation - the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (Transdniestria) and Gagauzia. The federal territory would consist of the rest of Moldova. The problem with the Russian proposal is that it would give to Transdniestria, through over-representation in the senate, combined with voting rules with high-qualified majority thresholds, veto-blocking power over vital legislation. It is invariably a highly delicate matter in federal systems to find a balance between the majoritarian principle and that of consensus, or veto powers. However, the Russian proposal manifestly goes much too far in giving blocking powers to Transdniestria. The problem is all the more serious given that the leadership of Transdniestria is an authoritarian regime, which has also acquired a reputation for trafficking of all kinds (drugs, weapons, people). One way of improving the present proposal would be to reduce drastically the number of competences over which Transdniestria would have blocking power. This would be crucial for Moldova's European perspectives, since integration with the EU ultimately involves a large amount of legislation in domains that would be joint competences. If Transdniestria wanted to block Moldova's European integration ambitions it could easily do so. A complementary method would be to have a much less disproportionate representation in the senate, and/or to have less high qualified majority voting thresholds. An alternative would be for Transdniestria not to gain exceptional minority powers in the federal legislation until and unless the regime had become sufficiently democratic, which the OSCE might monitor. While these appear, on the surface, to be technical matters, the stakes are highly political, and indeed geopolitical. There are choices to be made by all of the interested parties. Moldova's President, Vladimir Voronin, may be reflecting on three possible options.
This could lead to improving perspectives for Moldova (Chisinau). The Transdniestrian regime, which is already in a desperate condition, would further decline and ultimately, perhaps in a few years time, collapse. Thereafter reunification negotiations could resume under more favourable conditions for Moldova with a new and maybe democratic Transdniestrian regime. President Voronin was initially inclined to sign up on option one, with President Putin due to arrive on 25 November in Chisinau to co-sign the text. However the uproar of protests in the Moldovan opposition and civil society, coupled to diplomatic opposition in the West persuaded him to switch at the last minute to option two, and Putin's visit was cancelled at the last minute. The OSCE chairman-in-office, the Netherlands, had informed Voronin that there was no consensus for the Russian proposal. The EU could do well to make its position clear and credible, and prepare for option three, if option two fails. Its argument could thus be in two steps. First, essential improvements to the Russian proposal are necessary for Moldova to have a future in Europe. Secondly, if the Russian and Transdniestrian sides are unreasonable in resisting these, the EU would offer to Moldova (ie Chisinau alone) an immediate step into the Stabilization and Association Agreement process, with the possibility of ultimate EU membership equal to those already extended to the rest of south-east Europe, and without preconditions over reunification of Moldova. The EU would also offer conditional incentives to Transdniestria, but the conditions would amount to a regime change there. The choice is also for Russia, to either insist on backing a defective constitution, or rather to offer its support for a democratizing, modernizing and "Europeanizing" concept for the whole of Moldova with a better proposal, and so to enter into a new phase of cooperation with the EU in the overlapping near abroads.
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| Countries / Regions | Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine |
