Major feature on the European Union’s relations with Ukraine.

Date: 20/02/03

MEMBERSHIP of the European Union has been the main goal of Ukrainian foreign policy since 1998. The EU has so far been unwilling to acknowledge these aspirations.

Indeed, top officials have recently stated that Ukraine can never become a member of the Union. Kyiv, for its part, has done a lot to undermine the credibility of its European aspirations. Stuttering economic and political reforms has created an image of the country as a case of post-Soviet failure, rather than as a potential member, even in the very long run.

Nevertheless, Ukraine will become a direct neighbour upon enlargement in May 2004. Although the overall consequences of enlargement are widely expected to be positive, it will have negative effects for Ukraine, perhaps most notably because of the introduction of the Schengen visa regime in the new member states bordering the country.

A more coherent and durable basis for relations with Ukraine is needed. In the short-term, this would seek to limit, where possible, the negative consequences of enlargement and thereby counteract the growing sense of exclusion among Ukrainian diplomats and policymakers. In the longer term, the aim should be to enable the EU to extend its constructive influence more forcefully to support Ukraine's transition to a liberal market-based democracy, as has been so successfully achieved in other parts of central and eastern Europe.

A "new neighbours initiative" was proposed for the EU's relations with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine at the Copenhagen summit last December.

Ukraine is of course not happy about being lumped together with the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus and the Communist-led Moldova.

The differentiation vis-à-vis Russia implied by this initiative is however welcomed, although it is unlikely to end complaints from Ukraine about the EU's "Russia first" policy.

There have been several new initiatives for enhanced EU-Russia cooperation in recent years going beyond what is on offer to Ukraine, despite the fact that Russia does not seek membership.

Ukraine is seeking an association agreement with the prospect of membership as its medium-term goal. The Union seems unwilling to seriously contemplate this, preferring instead a more limited "neighbourhood" or "proximity" agreement, or the more recent (and perhaps more promising) "European integration" agreement.

But an agreementdevoid of the prospect of membership is unlikely to stop the demands from Ukraine, or, most importantly, serve as an important driving-force to achieve the overarching goal of "proximity policy" - the promotion of stability and prosperity in the wider Europe.

The EU should specify a road-map for Ukraine, elaborating a set of conditions and benchmarks that would need to be met in order to obtain a prospect of membership. This could be a unilateral declaration designed to deliver a strong, unambiguous message concerning the importance of the country as a direct neighbour that is seeking closer integration. The declaration should explicitly state the prospect of membership.

Equally important, it would specify criteria for opening negotiations on agreement that would upgrade Ukraine's relations with the EU. These include the current priorities, such as accession to the World Trade Organization and full implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Ukraine and the Union.

However, the conditionality should be broader and more "political" in scope, building on the experience of applying the Copenhagen criteria in the candidate countries. But in order not to exhaust the mobilising effect of political conditionality, these should be a softer variant of the Copenhagen criteria, requiring an improvement in areas such as fairness and freedom of elections, human rights, the justice system, and freedom of the media.

Such a declaration should precede or coincide with the upcoming enlargement in May 2004. This would also send a clear signal to Ukraine prior to the presidential elections, which are scheduled for autumn 2004. It should be emphasised that all possibilities inscribed in the declaration, which would pave the way for a new agreement, should be made conditional and come into force only after the necessary steps have been taken by Ukraine in the process of economic and political reforms.

The detailed and explicit set of priorities, as well as built-in conditionality, should lead to step-by-step integration only if and when Ukraine fulfils its objectives and obligations in different domains. Its candidate status should be conditional on implementation of the new agreement, coupled with fulfilment of the "Copenhagen Lite" criteria, followed by an opening of accession negotiations.

Many European countries have had wide-ranging agreements with the Union that could serve as models for a new EU-Ukraine agreement.

The association agreements signed by the central and eastern European states in the '90s, and the Stability and Association Agreements (SAAs) with Balkan countries, are particularly relevant. Like the SAAs, the new agreement with Ukraine would reflect the increased competences of the EU since the PCA was negotiated in the early 1990s. It would thus include the areas of justice and home affairs and common foreign and security policy, issues that are not included in PCA.

Such a new agreement would be part of the new "proximity policy" envisaged under Article 42 of the draft constitution of the EU currently under discussion by the Convention.

Commission President Romano Prodi has proposed the establishment of a "ring of friends" surrounding the enlarged EU. According to the formula "everything but institutions", neighbouring countries are expected to adopt EU policies and law, without participating in the elaboration of these laws.

This is perhaps not the most appropriate approach to making "friends", and perhaps a more inclusive approach is required.

Thus, over time and depending on the progress of the road-map, some deepening and broadening could also be envisaged as part of the agreement.

One could, for example, imagine Ukrainian participation in the numerous committees assisting the Commission in preparing new legislation (modelled on the agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA)).

Even more inclusive mechanisms include de facto participation in Council deliberations but without a vote (Schengen association agreements), and the setting up of independent agencies mirroring EU institutions to enforce the agreement (as for the EEA).

One could also envisage deeper and more extensive association with other Union policies, such as those developed in the European Security and Defence Policy with non-EU NATO members.

Such a road-map for relations with Ukraine would provide strong and clear incentives for the reform process in the country, including the consequences of no reform, and could strengthen the pro-reform forces.

• Grzegorz Gromadski is an analyst for the Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw. Oleksandr Suskho is director of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine. Marius Vahl is a research fellow for the Centre for European Policy Studies and Katarzyna Wolcuk is a lecturer at the University of Birmingham, UK and Jean Monnet fellow at the European University Institute, Firenze, Italy.