Lukashenko’s brand image is the real thing

By Edward Lucas

Date: 28/07/05

What's a dictatorship without a cult of personality and an ideology?

The long-suffering people of Turkmenistan have the Rukhuma -their eccentric president's thoughts in book form which is compulsory reading for students and many others. Russia is getting a lot more ideological, with a mix of Soviet-era nostalgia, glorification of the Second World War and old-style Russian patriotism, plus an obsessive official focus on the personality of President Vladimir Putin. But Belarus is, seemingly, lagging behind. According to a fascinating study I have just read by Natalia Leshchenko, a Belarus-born political scientist at the London School of Economics, President Alexander Lukashenko's approach seems pretty amateurish.

For a start, unlike his counterparts in Central Asia, Lukashenko shows no interest in an overt personality cult. There are no statues; his birthday passes all but unremarked. His doings lead the news, but nobody has to memorise his speeches.

On ideology too, the effort seems curiously half-hearted. There's no shortage of time and effort: there are compulsory courses on state ideology in schools and universities, plus monthly "days of ideology" at state enterprises with more than 300 employees (which must also have deputy directors responsible for ideology). But the concept itself is foggy, to say the least. The books on ideology are full of theory but inconclusive about content. Even the big state-sponsored pro-Lukashenko youth organisation can muster nothing more than the vague desire to "act in support of the state authority as the institution which guarantees law and order, stability and further development of the society".

On the face of it, that's a weakness. But Leshchenko argues it differently. "Ideology", she writes, "is one of the most successful undertakings by the Belarussian leader." Unlike traditional Soviet ideology, though, it does not consist of truths, but attitudes, principally feelings of security and pride. Belarussians are constantly reminded by the state propaganda machine that the outside world is dangerous, whereas life in Belarus is enviably calm and well-protected. Wages and social payments are on time, there is no terrorism, no political upheavals as in Ukraine or Georgia. The constant struggle by the authorities against external and internal enemies is not just successful, but grounds for pride. Belarus, argued Lukashenko in 2003, has been endowed "with the great mission of [being] the spiritual leader of the Eastern European civilisation".

This may make life harder for the opposition. When ideology is overt - as it was in the Soviet era - then it focuses resistance. What Belarus has is a more like an advertising campaign, focusing on branding and emotional loyalty. It is insidious - and much harder to resist.

So what bearing does that have on the big question about Belarus, whether it will survive as an independent state? Many have argued that Lukashenko may sound independent, but is in fact a Kremlin puppet, tolerated by the Russian authorities only so long as he is useful. His real role is to be the funeral director who delivers his country back into union with Russia. It is certainly true that he sounds a wild enthusiast for a merged state.

But look below the surface and things seem rather different. Lukashenko may not have made Belarus a very congenial country by Western standards, but he and his ideology have certainly made it distinctive - far more so than at independence in 1991. The union state, for all the bear-hugs and communiques, seems no closer than ever, not least because Lukashenko still thinks he would be the ideal person to lead it, making relations with Putin distinctly chilly. Two cheers, perhaps, for all that.

• Edward Lucas is Central and Eastern Europe correspondent for The Economist.

Commentary feature in which the author looks at the political ideology of Belarus' President, Alexander Lukashenko.