Lomé states struggle for a united front

Date: 03/09/1998

The 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries bound by the Lomé Convention are preparing their response to EU proposals for a new trade relationship. But are the models on offer really designed to meet the needs of Europe's former colonies? Mark Turner reports

LITTLE more than a century after the notorious Congress of Berlin, Europe is carving up Africa all over again.

In its recent call for inter-regional free trade arrangements (FTAs) with its 71 partner countries in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean (ACP) by the year 2005, the EU runs the risk of trying to mould the continent into four trade blocs long before it is ready.

The proposals form the centrepiece of a radical overhaul of the Lomé Convention, the trade-aid instrument which has bound Europe to its former colonies since 1975.

Instead of maintaining the privileged and one-sided market access of the past two decades, the Union is calling for reciprocal trade deals (albeit with transition periods and development support) with the Caribbean, the Pacific, southern Africa, western Africa, central Africa, eastern Africa, South Africa and Nigeria.

After widespread complaints, it has also offered a rather loosely defined alternative of Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) trade concessions, equivalent to current Lomé access, but there are growing doubts as to whether this would work in practice. The FTAs still seem to be the only serious option on the table.

The ACP countries themselves have so far proved unable to propose any coherent and viable alternatives, and may well end up having to accept European-born solutions to their problems.

Although ACP ambassadors remained in Brussels throughout August to prepare a position before negotiations begin at the end of this month, insiders say that the group is still a long way from fielding a comprehensive response to the Union's mandate.

“To get 15 EU states to get their act together is difficult enough ... To get 71 ACP states to reach a common position is very difficult,” says Philip Lowe, director-general of the European Commission's development arm DGVIII.

This caution is echoed by a London official, who adds: “To be honest, we do not really expect to begin genuine talks in September. The first few months will probably be a kind of phoney negotiation.”

Many fear that the lack of a genuine dialogue will persist beyond the first few months.

While the Caribbean states have a fairly strong identity, and have fought vocally against the free trade idea, it is hard to see how they will be able to forge a common line with, for example, west Africa.

Many of the francophone states distrust their overseas cousins and have traditionally showed more solidarity with France.

And apart from the Caribbean trade bloc CARICOM - itself facing questions over its relationship with Cuba and the Dominican Republic - there are few realistic assemblies for the Union to address.

East Africa is gradually piecing together its old cooperative mechanisms (EAC), but has a long way to go before overcoming its disastrous historical legacy. Furthermore, the EAC includes Tanzania, which is also part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and could have to make some painful decisions about where it belongs.

Southern Africa's structures are still weak and divisions are emerging between the members of this large and diverse bloc, which includes Laurent Kabila's Congo. Fears of South African domination are causing some concern, and SADC countries are wary of abandoning their wider ACP identity.

West and central Africa have currency unions, which would suggest that they are somewhat better prepared. But members of the central African customs union still impose tariffs on each other, and it is far from clear what will happen to western African countries like Ghana, which do not use the French currency-pegged CFA franc and do not fit into any other grouping.

Furthermore, the francophone countries have been reluctant to go beyond the loose statement of solidarity issued by last year's ACP summit in Libreville, which Lomé-watchers say would make a very poor basis for negotiations.

Nigeria, which has manifestly different interests from the rest of the region and a specialised oil economy, is likely to stand alone, and the Pacific islands have no regional institutions at all.

Under the circumstances, it is little surprise that the ACP secretariat, which has been criticised for not trying to reconcile these various positions, has found itself playing more of a reactive than a proactive role.

To its credit, the secretariat has warned of the lack of viable African blocs and has insisted very strongly that the EU should help the continent to develop exporting capacity.

“We do not have any major difficulties with the mandate,” says ACP secretary-general Peter Nagande. “All we are asking is whether these actions can be taken in the time. We want to say yes, we agree to free trade. But of our 71 members, only 10&percent; have the capacity to export.”

But at a time when changes to the world trade order are fundamentally challenging 20th-century political models, many of the basic questions facing the ACP are being sidestepped.

Are European models of democracy and good governance (both of which have a prominent place in the new convention) applicable to Africa? How can pan-continental class-based structures in the Union be transferred to countries where religion or ethnicity determine allegiance?

Is European integration, forged in the aftermath of war and pushed by strong political interests, a valid model for ACP states? Is the need for trade a strong enough motive to make Africa's ruling élites compromise when the political will is noticeably absent?

According to Lowe, regional cooperation is self-evidently a good thing.

“Many of the supply-side factors determining whether countries can sell goods depend on aspects that go beyond individual countries - take the west African energy situation, for example, or east African transport,” he argues.

“A lot of these small countries are not worth going into on their own for investors. If you want to create a reasonable environment for investment and trade, you need more ties. Africa's level of trade interpenetration is notoriously low at 6&percent;.”

But critics suggest that the EU's main concern may be to foster a zone of profitable investment for European companies by pressing a Europe-compatible model on to a vulnerable world, rather than to show genuine solidarity with African people.

The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht does not oppose regionalisation as such, but warns against pushing it too hard, too fast.

“The move of ACP countries towards regional integration can benefit from EU support, but it cannot be driven from outside,” it said in a recent policy paper.

It went on to suggest that it might be better for the ACP countries to wait until 2005 before committing themselves to any one route, by which time World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules for poor countries might be clearer and more flexible.

Other alternatives could include adopting a 'most favoured nation' (MFN) model of trade ties, which could be used as a negotiating tool in the next round of world trade talks. This more multilateral focus could help ACP countries to gain better access to fast-growing and relevant markets way beyond Europe.

The ACP could also make more capital out of the ill-defined GSP alternative, the ECDPM suggests, although that would still leave much power in Europe's hands and would require a serious rethink of EU trade relations with GSP-eligible countries like Brazil.

Defenders of the Union's stance stress that it has invited more dialogue. The new Lomé negotiating mandate calls for more 'ownership', and 'participation' in EU-ACP relations, and gives pride of place to civil society cooperation and decentralised decision-making.

But cynics point out that it is one thing to write fine words, and quite another to put them into practice.

The ACP may agree to incorporate 'ownership' into a new convention, but if in practice its member governments feel they had no input in its drafting, they are unlikely to pursue its objectives with their hearts and souls.

In addition, there are still widespread complaints that ordinary Africans have had little say in the Lomé deliberations.

“Only a small group of state servants know the contents of the convention. In a majority of ACP countries, farmer organisations are neither informed of its content or its potential to develop the peasantry,” complains the Belgian-based non-governmental organisation SOS Faim.

According to Lowe, however, any charges of European neo-colonialism should be put in context. “The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are much more revolutionary than the Commission. We put the brakes on,” he insists.