Kazaks better for EU than Tashkent tyrants

There are strong indications that the EU foreign ministers will use their next meeting (13 November) to roll back the sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan last year following Tashkent’s refusal to allow an independent inquiry into the Andizhan massacre of May 2005. The move to lift sanctions has been led by Germany and signals the first move in Berlin’s ambition to reshape the EU’s policies toward its immediate neighbourhood to the east during its forthcoming presidency of the European Union.

Sanctions, it is suggested, have served to move Tashkent into the Russian camp, thereby undermining the EU’s strategic position, while China is also building a closer relationship with Tashkent. The payoff for removing the sanctions and re-opening a dialogue will be to promote Uzbek domestic reforms while also allowing the EU to address some of the major regional problems that are difficult to solve without President Islam Karimov’s co-operation. A new relationship with Tashkent will also help the EU gain access to Central Asia’s rich energy resources.

A strengthening of EU engagement with the countries of Central Asia is to be welcomed. The selection of Uzbekistan as the initial focus for the new policy, however, is troubling.

Freedom House ranks Uzbekistan as one of the most authoritarian countries in the world - along with states such as North Korea, Burma and Sudan. Leading human rights organisations as well as some EU member states highlight the continued systematic violation of human rights in Uzbekistan, notably the widespread use of torture. Since the Andizhan events, Uzbekistan has shown no serious commitment to reform its political or human rights record and none of the benchmarks established by the EU as part of the sanctions mechanism has been met.

It is not sanctions that are the problem in the EU’s relationship with Uzbekistan but rather Karimov’s genetic disposition to authoritarianism.

No amount of ‘critical dialogue’ - which the EU proposes as an alternative to sanctions - will change an approach that has served the incumbent leadership of Uzbekistan so well. With no likelihood of real change, many international NGOs are calling for a sharpening of sanctions against Tashkent or at least giving the current sanctions (imposed only late last year) the opportunity to bite.

Nor is the removal of sanctions likely to strengthen the position of the EU in Central Asia. Those pressing for a lifting of sanctions believe that co-operation with Tashkent is vital for the fight against Islamist terrorism, drug trafficking and a host of other regional challenges. In fact, many of these problems are direct by-products of Karimov’s 16 years of authoritarian rule. During this period, regime-based corruption, economic policies that have served to impoverish much of the population, and Tashkent’s use of repression as the policy of first resort have together played a major part in promoting instability and criminality in the region. Simultaneously, Karimov has pursued a policy of blowing hot and cold toward his immediate neighbours. This carefully calculated manoeuvring has served to create many of the region’s problems - notably the chronic problems along Uzbekistan’s borders - while at the same time reinforcing the notion that Uzbekistan is the geopolitical key to stability in Central Asia.

Against this background, a climbdown by the EU on sanctions would simply represent another spin of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy merry-go-round and serve to strengthen the Karimov regime. Such a step is also likely to intensify the shabby realpolitik focused on geopolitical advantage and access to Central Asia’s hydrocarbon reserves as other major powers move to sweeten their relationship to Tashkent. This is a game that the EU is ill-equipped to win. Even competing in this contest is likely to exact a high cost on the Union’s image as a supporter of democracy while in reality contributing little of significance to the long-term stability of Central Asia.

Central Asia is not an easy neighbourhood and all the countries of the region face urgent challenges. The European Union can and should play a role in enhancing stability as well as promoting a genuine process of political and economic reform in the region. Gaining access to the region’s energy resources must also be a priority for Brussels as part of efforts to diversify from dependence on Russia. A focus on Uzbekistan as the pivot of EU policy without a serious commitment from the Tashkent regime to substantial reform will not, however, deliver on the EU’s aims of promoting stability, development and political change in the region.

If the EU is to play a positive role in the region it must look instead to develop strategic relationships with countries in Central Asia where there are prospects for genuine progress. Kazakstan is fast emerging as a dynamic and economically powerful regional actor with substantial hydrocarbon reserves. While currently falling well short of European standards in democracy and human rights, the Kazaks have signalled an interest in participating in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy and in the possibility of joining the Council of Europe. Kazakstan is also pursuing the chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 2009 - a decision will be made at the OSCE ministerial meeting at the beginning of December. These are real opportunities for a substantial dialogue about reform.

The new ‘EU Ostpolitik’ in Central Asia should surely begin with encouragement for Kazakstan’s ambitions to deepen its relationship with Europe and with support for concrete progress in political liberalisation and respect for human rights by the Kazaks, rather than with letting Tashkent off the hook.

Above all, dialogue with Kazakstan offers a more realistic prospect of promoting the emergence of a Central Asia containing important states friendly to the EU and aspiring to the Union’s values. This would be a change that even Tashkent could not ignore.

• Neil Melvin is visiting senior research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).

There are strong indications that the EU foreign ministers will use their next meeting (13 November) to roll back the sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan last year following Tashkent’s refusal to allow an independent inquiry into the Andizhan massacre of May 2005. The move to lift sanctions has been led by Germany and signals the first move in Berlin’s ambition to reshape the EU’s policies toward its immediate neighbourhood to the east during its forthcoming presidency of the European Union.